Original Research Article

Al Shabaab and its Violent Extremism in Kenya

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Abstract

The purpose of this paper on "Al Shabaab and its Violent Extremism in Kenya" aimed at exploring the dynamics of al Shabaab in Somalia as it affected Kenya. This descriptive research adopted judgmental sampling technique and relied mostly on secondary source (books, journal articles, monographs, internet materials etc) of data collection which were sourced in Nigerian libraries, subjected to content validity before analyzing qualitatively. Results of the findings revealed that the spillover of al Shabaab's violent extremism to Kenya was caused by porous borders as well as local forces such as historic marginalization, propaganda technique and the presence of al Hijrah sect in Kenya. Al Shabaab has impacted negatively on Kenya's security, diplomacy, economy as well as humanitarian services. Kenya has responded through the creation of Operation Linda Nchi and Operation Usalama Watch while United States, Africa Union Mission in Somalia, United Nations and European Union also assisted in fighting the dreaded sect according to findings. The contribution of these findings to the explanation of Rosenau's linkage theory is excellent thereby deepening the understanding of its basic assumptions. Regrettably, Al Shabaab is still a potential threat to Kenya and the entire Horn of Africa, therefore, the paper recommends inclusive dialogue, national integration and constructive engagement as panacea for al Shabaab violent extremism.
Keywords: Al Shabaab, Economy, Humanitarian, Linkage, Muslim Security, Radicalization, Theory, Violent Extremism.

INTRODUCTION

Undoubtedly, the end of the former President Mohammed Siad Barre's regime in 1991 was the beginning of Somalia's political instability and the rise of the Islamic violent sect in that country. Al Ittihad Al Islamiya (AIA) was a known Islamic violent group that was suppressed by the authoritarian government of Siad Barre (Harnisch, 2010). The government did not allow this group to operate openly but rather embraced the Sunni sect which majority of Somalis belong. The government of the then President, Barre hunted for the group members, hence some left Somalia to neighbouring countries; Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti while those that remained in the Central and Southern Somalia operated underground. As Marangio (2012) confirmed; "traditionally Somali society has been characterized by Sufi orders, mostly a political and strictly connected to the concept of asabiyya – a form of social legitimacy based on blood ties within group

(family, clan etc)... from the 1960s onwards, Wahhabi groups started to spread across Somalia, supported by local traditionally conservative Gulf states" (p.6).

International Crisis Group (2005) specifically identified Saudi Arabia as a Gulf state that was actively supporting Wahhabisim in Somalia through the establishment of many Madrasas (Islamic schools), as well as offering young Somalis opportunity to study Islamic programmes in their schools. However, this policy was aimed at diminishing Soviets influence in Somalia. President Barre was a known socialist and his alignment with Soviet Union was a direct threat to Saudi Arabia's ideological and religious influence in Somalia. Regrettably, when Barre's government collapsed in 1991, "Wahhabism continued to gain support...considered themselves as the only true believers...classifying all other groups, including the Sufi Orders as apostates to be placed outside the Ummah "(the community of the faithful)" (Marangio,

2012, p.6). President Mohdi Mohammed that succeeded Barre on 26th January 1991 had legitimacy crisis created by the Wahhabi Islamic group. This Islamic group instigated the creation of Islamic Courts Union (ICU) throughout the entire Central and Southern Somalia. Magadishu and Kismayo were regarded as the centres of the Wahhabi group. Subsequent President, Ali Mohammed ended his regime on 3rd January 1997 and left the state in a fragmented order. Al Ittihad Al Islamiya (AIAI) the militant arm of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) started exercising executive power through enforcement of Islamic law; Sharia. Its influence extended to the neighbouring country hence converted Lung and Robow Ali in Ethiopia as training camps for their militants. Menkahaus (2005) recalled that:

The Islamic Courts Union's control of Lung and Robow Ali's Islamist training camps worried the Ethiopians. Moreover, the Ethiopian branch of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) conducted several terror attacks inside Ethiopia in 1996, including two hotel bombings and assassination attempts. Consequently, Ethiopia military forces drove the Islamic Courts Union out of Lung and the border region and eradicated its safe haven (p.35).

The Ethiopian military did not only end the training camps in Lung and Robow Ali but invaded the Central and the Southern Somalia where Islamic Courts Union was operating freely without regard to the United Nations backed Transitional National Government, headed by Abdiqqsim Salad Hassan. The resistance that the Ethiopian troops met forced them to retreat back. Regrettably, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) overthrew Transitional National Government in 2006. The Islamic Courts Union became a defacto government controlling the entire Magadishu, Kismayo and its environs. Coincidentally all this happened when Osama bin Laden was a fugitive in Sudan (1992-1996), but later left to Pakistan (1997-2011). The defeat of the Ethiopian troops spurred Osama bin Laden to plead with Muslim Ummah to support the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). Burke (2004) hinted that, "Osama bin Laden... identified the Islamic Courts Union as a potential ally, or proxy, for his nascent international network...sent Arab envoys who had served in Afghanistan to Somalia to offer support and training to different Somalia groups" (p.49). Similarly, Sage (2009) further explained that:

Evidence suggests that in the mid to late 1990s cooperation between the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and the al Qaeda strengthened. The Islamic Courts Union (ICU) allegedly received some degree of training, logistical, and financial support from al Qaeda. Some of the leaders also went on to train and fight with bin Laden's group in Afghanistan. One such fighter was Sheikh Aadan Haashi Ayro, who eventually became the leader of al-Shabaab. The Islamic Courts Union reciprocated al Qaeda's support by providing protection to the al Qaeda in East Africa cell.

In 2006, the military wing of the Islamic Courts Union had internal crisis. This led to the breakaway of Hassein Dahir Aweis' group who formally applied to Ayman al Zawahri, the successor of Osama bin Ladan as a full fledge al Qaeda in East Africa and changed its name from Al Ittihad Al Islamyya to al Shabaab (meaning youth) in 2007. Harnisch (2014) hinted that, "this small group adopted the name al Shabaab" and came to serve as a military wing of the emerging political force called the Islamic Courts Union (ICU)" (p.11). The group won public support through effective communication, and their propaganda technique. According to Taaruby and Hallundback (2010) al Shabaab used sophisticated media outfit to disseminate its information. Al Qaeda information outlet like Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF) and al Shabaab's own publications, videos including internet and YouTube were freely used to communicate with its audience. It should be recalled that one of the Spokesman of al Shabaab, Abu Ayoub (2007) inspired Muslim youths in a YouTube by asking them:

Are you happy in your comfort while your religion and your people are being attacked and humiliated? What honour is that?... is it that you have been deceived by this temporary life and you have fallen into the traps of the unbelievers?... I advise you to return to your religion by living for it and dying for it, instead of living for money and fame. I advise you to migrate to Somalia and wage Jihad against your enemies. As of those of you who are not able to migrate and fight, then it is still obligation upon you to support the jihad with wealth...know that Allah multiplies the reward of spending for his sake in Jihad 700 times over (cited in Taaruby & Hallundback, 2010, p.41).

Effective communication and its propaganda technique enabled al Shabaab to recruit its members from far and near. Majority of its members are from Horn of Africa especially Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda while others are from Asia, America and Europe. However, the total number of al Shabaab militants is still unknown. Blue Peace Bulletin (2019) posited that, "al Shabaab has an estimated 7000-9000 fighters primarily based in Central and Southern Somalia, especially in the rural areas. The group is extremely well organized and capable of striking prominent targets causing hundreds of fatalities in a single attack" (p.4). Most youths in the Horn of Africa that joined al Shabaab are victims of bad governance in their home states. They have graduated from schools but no work and some are mature to marry, yet no money to pay dowry. In short, their future is uncertain, therefore, they can easily be deceived by the militant group and be recruited into their fold. NATO Strategic Direction-South Hub (2021) further explained that, "frustration with living conditions, with no realistic expectation of things ever improving, is one of the main causes of people veering towards joining a terrorist group" (p.14).

In Central and Southern Somalia where al Shabaab controlled, the group rendered service to the people and performed the role of the state in key critical areas, especially, road construction, Islamic education, security, settlement of dispute as well as tax collection. International Crisis Group (2014) added that:

The group gives salaries to elders who stay in rural areas with their clans. It also empowers younger men, especially form clans dominated by others to better, protect their communities and immediate families...it reconciles with clans with which it has clashed in the past...above all...it pays its soldiers and operatives well and regularly...provides for its veterans and the families of its "martyrs for much of the last five years, its operations in South-Central Somalia resembled a "fiscal-military state" (pp.14-15).

Despite this, al Shabaab is one of the worst violent groups in the history of mankind. Their adherence to the strict implementation of Sharia is what qualify them to be described as terrorist group, hence must be condemned by all. In 2008, al Shabaab destroyed Churches in Kismayo and amputed a young man, Mohammed Omar Ismail who stole 10 pairs of trousers and 10 shirts that worth $90. Mohammed Yusuf, a native of Mogadishu was accused of stealing 100 United States Dollars and was sentenced to amputation in 2009. It should also be recalled that Christians were found guilty of spies in Baidoa. This crime led to execution by beheading in June, 2009. In 2008, a 13-year-old girl, Asho Duhulow was accused of prostitution in Kismayo, even though she was gang raped by a group of young men. Asho was stoned to death, in line with Islamic law (Shepherd, 2008, cited in Taaruby & Hallundback, 2010). The independent (2009) further hinted that:

In Marka in Southern Somalia, people were stopped on the street by members of al Shabaab to have their gold teeth forcibly removed. Residents who had silver or gold fillings were taken to the local al Shabaab stronghold where a hooded man, referred to as a doctor, used his hand or a pincer in case the tooth was firmly embedded in the jaw. The reasoning behind this practice, according to al Shabaab, was that fashion and beauty are strictly prohibited in Islam and that interpretation would include gold and silver fillings (cited in Taaruby & Hallundback, 2010, p.18).

African Continent in general and the Horn of Africa in particular have witnessed violent crimes from terrorist organizations for sometimes now. Harnisch (2010) cited violent crimes committed by al Shabaab in Uganda, Kenya, Somalia, and Ethiopia, though not in detail. In August 1998, Al Ittihad Al Islamiya (AIAI) which later metamorphosed into the present al Shabaab attacked the American Embassy in Kenya and Tanzania. In 2002, the same group attacked Israeli Hotel in Mombasa, Kenya. International Crisis Group (2018) maintained that, "most prominent was a 2013 complex attack on the Westgate Mall in Up Market Quarter of the Kenyan Capital Nairobi, which resulted in a four-day occupation of the mall, 67 deaths and considerable embarrassment for the Kenyan security forces" (p.1). It should also be recalled that in 2009, the late leader of al Shabaab, Ahmed Godane had said, "we will fight and the wars will not end until Islamic Sharia is implemented in all continents of the world and until Muslims liberate Jerusalem" (cited in NATO Strategic Direction-South Hub, 2021, p.10). NATO Strategic Direction – South Hub (2021) also recalled that, al Shabaab threatened to attack shopping malls in United Kingdom, United States and Canada. Marchal (2012) equally posited that Ahmed Diriye, one of the leaders of al Shabaab threatened to attack France "following the republication of controversial cartoons portraying the Prophet Mohammed" (p.6). Worthy to note, is the fact that international community did not pay attention to the al Shabaab during its early formation in Somalia. Besteman and College (2019) hinted that, "it was only after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States (US) that the United States (US) resumed military activities in Somalia. In the wake of 9/11 United States (US) security panics identified Somalia's ongoing statelessness as offering a potential opportunity for terrorists" (p.3). The United States had to establish partnership with the neighbouring countries, especially Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda in order to stamp out this devil from the Horn of Africa. United Nations Assistance Mission as well as African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) that attracted 22,000 troops from Uganda, Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti and Sierra Leone intervened in Somalia crisis. This led to the forceful withdrawal of al Shabaab from the Central and Southern Somalia. They are now operating in the rural areas bordering Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda. However, the group has promised to fight until the end of the world. Weber (2015) maintained that, "to al Shabaab AMISOM is a crusader operation that must be fought not only within Somalia, but also in the countries from which its forces originate, above all, Uganda and Kenya..." (p.16).

In the same vein, Bryden (2014) opined that, "from an international perspective, al Shabaab (and its affiliated networks, such as Kenya's al Hijra) remains a perspective threat especially to Somalia's immediate neighbours and other troop contributing countries (TCCs)…" (p.2). Surprisingly, extant literature ignores the impacts of the al Shabaab insurgency and its violent extremism on the Somali's immediate neighbours especially Kenya rather proliferate on the domestic dynamics of the terrorist group in Somalia, thereby creating intellectual gap in academic world. The main aim of this paper is to analyze the external dynamics of the al Shabaab insurgency, especially as it affects the Somalia's immediate neighbour Kenya through careful explanation of the underlisted research questions.

i. Which theoretical framework can effectively analyze al Shabaab violent extremism in Kenya?

ii. What factors responsible for promoting al Shabaab radicalization of Kenyan Muslim youths?

iii. What are the impacts of al Shabaab violent extremism on Kenya?

iv. What are the responses of international community to al Shabaab violent extremism?

The first section of this journal article deals with theoretical framework while the second section is the material and method of analysis. Factors promoting al Shabaab extremism in Kenya constitute the third section. The fourth section is the impacts of the al Shabaab on Kenya, while the responses to al Shabaab violent extremism in Kenya are the fifth section. Concluding remarks and the references constitute the last part of this journal article.

The Theoretical Framework: James Rosenau's Linkage Theory

James Rosenau (1969) propounded the linkage theory. The aim of this theory was to establish the interdependence of state and non-state actors on one another. According to Rosenau (1969), the term "linkage" refers to "any recurrent sequence of behaviour that originates in one system and is reacted to, in another." Indeed, linkage theory establishes the relationship or inter-connectivity between the domestic politics and foreign policy. "It also emphasizes the fact that both national and international politics co-exist together in a single system" (Johari, 2017, p.158). These views corroborate the idea of Nye and Keohane (1977) who opined that international system is an interdependent system in which different actors are both sensitive to (affected by) and vulnerable to (suffering, costly effects from) the actions of others. In the light of these postulations, Rosenau's (1969) linkage theory, however, is a projection of the interdependence and interaction that exist in the international system. It established the fact that international system could only survive in an environment where there is an input and output.

Johari (2011) hinted that, "the initial and the terminal stages of "linkage" are described as "inputs" and "outputs and differentiated according to their origin within the state or within the existing environment" (p.157). Supporting Rosenau (1969) Dougherty and Pfaltgraff (1979) alerted that, there is an agreement among scholars in the field of international relations that the domestic forces within the national political units exert major effect on the international system. These domestic forces are the "inputs" while the responses by the international community are the "outputs." The inextricable relationship between the

input and the output is what Rosenau (1969) described as linkage.

Rosenau (1969) equally hinted that there are three forms of linkage; namely, the penetrative, reactive as well as emulative linkage. Penetrative linkage refers to a form of linkage in which one polity (state) serves as a participant in the political process of another, and shares the authority to allocate values within the penetrated unit. Johari (2011) also maintained that Rosenau's (1969) penetrative linkage embraces not only political and military but also economic and could be usefully employed to analyze industries and economies dominated by massive foreign investments. Reactive linkage, is a linkage that is caused by the boundary-crossing reaction without direct foreign participation in the decision made within the unit. Johari (2011) highlighted again that even though "those responsible for the input do not penetrate the other unit but nevertheless those responsible for the outputs with the unit do react" (p.158). In addition, emulative linkage focuses on the demonstration effect, especially in a situation whereby political activities in one country are perceived and emulated by another. Indeed, linkage is "emulative" when a state tries to match the "initiating state" but becomes "imitative" when a state copies the initiating state without any expectation of "matching" (Johari, 2011). Lastly, Rosenau also postulated "adaptive behavior as an important offshoot of the linkage theory." The adaptive behavior highlights the fact that "nations can be viewed as adapting entities with similar problems that arise out of the need to cope with the environment" (Johari, 2011, p.158). In conclusion, nations seek understanding not in unique factor, but in common factor according of Rosenau (1969).

Relating all these postulations to the subject matter, it is not arguable that the entire Horn of Africa is the system that is affected by the Somali crisis. The Somali crisis operates in an environment that contains both the state actors (Somalia, Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda, Eritrea and United States among others) and the non-state actors (Islamic Courts Union, al Shabaab al Hijra, United Nations, African Union Mission in Somalia, Ras Kamoni, etc). The al Shabaab crisis is an input that leads to an output, which is the spillover of the crisis to Kenya and Ethiopia. This led to the foreign military intervention in Somalia's internal crisis. This confirmed Kadar (2012) assertion that, "actors are threatened by the internal conflict that spread over the international borders affecting regional and international security, hence external actors find it imperative to act against the posed threats using diverse national and international instruments" (cited in Muhammed, 2014, p.24). Furthermore, Rosenau's (1969) penetrative linkage which highlights foreign participation in the political process of another, could be explained within the context of foreign military

intervention in Somalia's crisis. United States government has not formally declared war against al Shabaab in Somalia, however, former President Trump had bombed areas occupied by al Shabaab in Somalia severally. Besteman and College (2019) hinted that:
United States airstrikes against the Somali terrorist group...al Shabaab, have skyrocked...between 15 and 21 drone strikes...from 2007-2014...killing at least 252 people. Recent reports suggest other entities, such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) are also carrying out an unknown number of additional airstrikes, and the United States currently has about 500 troops, mostly special operations, stationed in Somalia.

African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) intervened militarily in that crisis, in order "to reduce the threat of al Shabaab and other armed opposition groups and assist the Somali security forces to provide security for the political process at all levels" (Peace & Security Report, 2019, p.7).

In 2011, Kenyan Assistant Minister of Internal Security, Onwe Ojode, hinted that the military intervention by Kenyan Defence Force (KDF) in Somalia, "was to dismantle the al Qaeda – affiliated Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen, but not to maintain a prolonged presence in Somalia" (cited in Warner, 2012, p.105). International Crisis Group (2018) further hinted that, "Ugandan forces were the first to arrive in 2007. In October 2011, Kenya deployed forces too...Nairobi...intervention was...aimed to curtail al Shabaab activity in the region of Somalia adjoining Kenya, to shield its North Eastern Province...ease its refugee burden by creating conditions allowing Somalis to return home" (p.4).

Reactive Linkage which Roseanau (1969) explained as a cross boundary reaction could be highlighted within the context of Kenya repressive attitude in Somalia. Kenya forcefully repatriated Somali refugees back to Somalia, despite the fact that she is a respected member of United Nations Organization and a signatory to UN Convention on Refugee. Human Rights Watch (2009) recorded that, "on January 25, 2009, Kenya Police arrested 100 Somali nationals, including 59 children under the age of 12, in the town of Wajir, approximately 100 kilometres from border and 23 kilometres from Dadaab's Camps, charged them with "illegal presence", fined them, and deported them to Somalia" (p.19). Similarly, Wakube, Nyagah, Mwangi and Attree (2016) recalled that, "in March 2011, al Shabaab militants fired at Kenyan General Service Unit (Paramilitary Police) water tank in the border town of Liboi. In response General Service Unit officers entered Somalia and killed a dozen suspected al Shabaab militants" (p.2). Even the unilateral decision of Kenyan government to create Jubaland as an autonomous state within Somalia, without consultation with the home state constitutes cross boundary reaction.

Though Kenya defended, its action that the Jubaland would serve as a buffer zone against al Shabaab militants and a permanent resident for the refugees from Somalia it is an open secret that the control of Kismayo port and other economic resources in Jubaland supersede its security interest. As Muhammed (2014) stated:
Although the Kenyan forces now operate in Somalia under the mandate of African Union and United Nations Security Council, they are interested and critically involved in the settlement of Jubaland. The Kenyan troops operate in the Jubaland region and play a prominent role in its establishment. This behavior of Kenya in this conflict is unlikely to produce a holistic solution for Somalia's conflict; it rather focuses on a partial solution in which its national interest is bound (pp.47-48).

Rosenau (1969) postulated the emulative linkage and hinted that it is concerned with demonstration effects, especially in a situation in which political activities in one state can be copied by another. Marangio (2012) hinted that in Somalia, hotels, tourist centres including Churches are targets for the Islamist group. The terrorists see these places as centre of immorality, hence must be destroy without delay. In Garissa, Kenya, the Islamist clandestinely destroyed these places too. According to Wakube, Nyagah, Mwangi and Attree (2016), "hotels may be targeted...because the way they operate is considered "haram" (forbidden by Islamic law) ...the sale of alcohols at Kwa Chege Hotel in Garissa had annoyed some community members prior to the armed attack that left 6 people dead and... 10 injured in April, 2013" (p.13). Similarly, al Shabaab had emulated its mother organization al Qaeda, since its affiliation in 2007. The same mode of operation of al Qaeda and Taliban in Afghanistan, is the same way the group operated in Somalia. Taaruby and Hallundback (2010) alerted that, "the al Qaeda and Taliban inspired, ideology of al Shabaab...in the desecration of religious symbols, the imposition of Sharia inspired form of justice, and severe restrictions on permissible forms of entertainment and cultural traditions." (p.15). Like al Qaeda in Afghanistan, al Shabaab also destroyed the Sufi shrines and graves in Somalia. The group also condemned the practice of praying at these places, since it constitutes idol worshipping. According to Kohlmann (2009), "Sufi shrines and graves have been the target of militants who claim that praying beside a revered Sufi scholar, amount to idol worshipping which is strictly forbidden according to their religious interpretation" (p.20).

Lastly, Rosenau (1969) postulated adaptive behavior which is concerned with coping with the existing situation within the environment. Unarguably, Somalis had been forced to accept al Shabaab as alternative to a stateless society like Somalia. There is

no doubt that Somalia is a "fail state", therefore, any non-state actor that can play the role of the state would be welcomed without any hesitation. Al Shabaab imposed taxes on the people, especially the area its control in Central and Southern Somalia, however, the people were happy to pay, since al Shabaab provided them with essential services, like Islamic schools (madrasas), roads, water etc. As International Crisis Group (2014) stated, "nevertheless, donations can be expected to continue, since Somalis have praised al Shabaab for "charitable" work like drilling boreholes, digging irrigation canals and building mosques and madrasas...al Shabaab did also distribute some relief..." (p.17). Al Shabaab also settled dispute among various clans within its territory. Regretting the departure of al Shabaab from Marka Town in Lower Shabella, a militia leader, Ahamed Mohammad decreed that, "in the past, al Shabaab sought to reconcile his clan and another who were in protracted dispute, but since al Shabaab departure, their military contestation with the opposing clan has escalated dramatically" (cited in Cruch, 2018, p.17).

MATERIALS AND METHODS

This paper on "al Shabaab and its Violent Extremism in Kenya" adopted descriptive design that relied on the secondary sources (books, journal articles, monographs, internet materials, conference papers etc) of data collection. These data were sourced from Nigerian libraries as well as internet, subjected to content validity before analyzing it qualitatively. The qualitative method enabled the researcher to embark on an indept analysis of activities of al Shabaab, not only in Somalia but also in Kenya. The qualitative method also helped in exploring gaps in previous literature on al Shabaab. However, the population of this study include; Somalia, Kenya, Ethiopia, al Qaeda in East Africa, Al Ittihad Al Islamiya, al Hijrah as well as al Shabaab. Despite the multiplicity of actors in Somalia's crisis, the researcher decided to choose al Shabaab as the sample of the study. The choice of al Shabaab is judgmental in view of the fact that there is abundant literature on Boko Haram, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb including Islamic State of West Africa Province. Regrettably, sketchy materials are available on the al Shabaab and its violent extremism in Kenya. The dearth of materials on al Shabaab opens space for unsupported arguments, which is dangerous in academics. This study would bridge the gap in knowledge and present arguments on al Qaeda with supported facts.

Factors Promoting Al Shabaab Violent Extremism in Kenya

The spillover of al Shabaab violent extremism to Kenya did not come as a surprise. Kenyan society is interwoven with series of complexities, ranging from religion, ethnicity, economic, including politics. The state has been accommodating these complexities since the colonial period to the independence era. The central

issue in Kenya especially the North Eastern Province (formerly named North Frontier District) that comprises Garissa, East Leigh, Wajir, Mandera among others is marginalization (Marangio, 2014). Historically, the indigenes of this province opted for separate state during the pre-independence period but they were denied on the ground that the territory was small and economically weak. Harnisch (2010) also recorded that when Somalia got independence on 1960, the North Eastern Province of Kenya requested the colonial master of Kenya (Britain) to cede the area to Somalia, which was an Italian colony, but Britain refused. "The regime enforced a form of military administration, implementing policies that effectively isolated the area from rest of Kenya...it made no efforts toward the socioeconomic and political integration of its population" (Andewan, 2014, Otunnu, 1992, cited in Lindi, Mutahi & Oosteroom, 2015, p.18). The post independence Kenya was not different from the colonial master. It made known to the inhabitants of the North Eastern Province that it will not compromise its territorial borders. "Socioeconomic marginalization of the region persisted and the state justified its adverse policies for North Eastern Province by referring to the secessionist sentiment" (Mahmood, 2008, p.30). The fact is that Muslim inhabited the province and it was part of the former "Greater Somalia" that extended to Ethopia and Uganda. Kenyan Presidents who had been Christians since independence can never accept it even though Muslim population occupy most cities (Nairobi, Mobassa, Garissa, East Leigh, Lamu among others) and constitute 4.3 million people according to 2009 Kenyan Population Census (International Crisis Group, 2012).

Interestingly, the North Eastern Province of Kenya shares land border with Southern Somalia, which is the epicenter of the al Shabaab's violent extremism. The people share the same culture, and are not strangers to Islamic Movement, that became radicalized since 1990. International Crisis Group (2012) hinted that:
Kenyan Muslims are no exception. They have become more observant, and a small portion has been radicalized...has been exposed to various strains of radical Islamism in the last four decades, much of it based on an amalgam of Salafi theologies...the best supported...Wahhabism...the aim was to subvert the traditional Shafimazhab (sect) and related Sufi orders and convert their adherents to Wahhabism (p.5).

Brown (1996) posited that, "local conflicts have great potential to "spillover" and create military problems for neighbouring states" (p.600). Even Giddens (1985) also argued that, "a state only exists within a system of states" (p.79). Kenyans themselves knew that the spillover of al Shabaab insurgency and its violent extremism must surely extend to its territory. Onwe Ojode, (2007) former Assistant Internal Security Minister of Kenya described al Shabaab as "a big

animal with a head in East Leigh, Nairobi and its tail in Somalia" (Standard, 2011 cited in Lind, Mutahi & Oosterom, 2015, p. 15). In the same vein, the former Deputy Defence Minister, Joshua Orwa (2011) likened "al Shabaab to a snake with its tail in Somalia and head in East Leigh" (Odula, 2011, cited in International Crisis Group 2012, p.11). As stated earlier, the infiltration of Kenyan society by al Shabaab and its consequences did not come unexpected. North Eastern Province of Kenya was the host community for the defeated Al Ittihad Al Islamiya (AIAI) members who escaped Southern Somalia in 1996, following the United States backed Ethiopian army invasion of Islamic Courts Union (ICU) government. The escapees were easily blended with local Muslim community, especially Wahhabi sect that shared the same ideology with them in Kenya. As International Crisis Group (2012) narrated:

AIAI was an early prototype of an Islamist Group...most important, its military defeat did not lead to the demise of its extremist ideology if anything, it added to its virulence, increased its force and inspired the emergence of al Shabaab...key members scattered over Somali speaking Horn of Africa- Kenya included and beyond, blending in and even regaining political and business influence...AIAI was not a chance occurrence but the product of a radicalized society, it...maintained a formidable clandestine support network in North Eastern Province throughout the 1990s and beyond.

Therefore, when al Shabaab was formally linked to al Qaeda through its late leader Ahmed Godane in 2006, its cell was already established in Kenya. Their followers did not go to Somalia for indoctrination, rather had it in Sunni Mosques in Nairobi, Mombasa, Mandera, Garissa and East Leigh. Citing United Nations (UN) Monitoring Group (2010), Lind, Mutahi and Oosterom (2015) hinted that Muslim Youth Centre (MYC) which later emerged as al Hijra was the syndicate that clandestinely recruited for al Shabaab in Kenya. The recruitment centre was at Pumwani Riyadhe Mosque in Nairobi. The recruits were secretly sent to Southern Somalia for training and fighting. This centre had mobilized and recruited at least 700 followers to fight in Somalia (Findlay, 2014). Muslim leaders in Kenya did not help the state, rather complicated the security situation in Kenya. The Wahhabi sect and their leaders paid Zakat (Islamic tax) to the group, on the pretext that it would help in supporting Islamic activities in Kenya. The Muslim Youth Centre (MYC) extended the recruitment drive from Mosques to prayers and entertainment centres, especially in North Eastern Province. The sympathizer of al Shabaab in Kenya did not hide their resentment against the state. Sheikh Ahmed Ali, the leader and coordinator of al Shabaab in Kenya was cited in International Crisis Group (2012) as a commander of about 200 to 500 fighters, mostly Kenyans.

International Crisis Group (2018) further stated that Muslim Youth Centre, "...began recruiting fighters-both to travel to Somalia and to carry out attacks within Kenya in areas outside previous hubs in Momasa, Nairobi and Northern Kenya...and particularly in Western and Central Kenya, it sought to convert Christian Youths, departing from its past focus on preying on anti-state sentiment among Muslims" (p.7).

Furthermore, al Shabaab media capacity and its propaganda technique were second to none. This is an aspect analysts of Kenyan crisis often asked why government could not successfully counter it, through the state ministry of information and communications as well as its agencies. The fact is that media houses in Kenya were afraid to speak against al Shabaab. Al Shabaab too, was using ideological factors to indoctrinate its followers. Its media houses were sophisticated and its internet service were often used to reach out to it followers. There were two radio stations that al Shabaab operated in Kenya. These stations were Radio Rehema and Radio Iqra. Their broadcasters were indoctrinated fellows who used Wahhabi ideology to convince their audience. They did not hide their hatred against the state and Christian community. Al Shabaab Clergies also used the radio to broadcast their messages to their members. In 2010, riot erupted in Nairobi following the forceful extradition of a Jamaican Islamic Clergy, Sheik Abdullah al Faisal who used Radio Iqra to castigate the Kenyan State and accused Christians of infidelity. Indeed, the two radio stations were anti-society, since it did not educate people on peaceful coexistence, nor promote unity. International Crisis Group (2012) further posited that, "their extreme polemical language…at time resulted in tensions between Christians and Muslims" (p.8). There is no doubt that al Shabaab won the hearts of most Kenyan Muslim youths through propaganda. One of the Spokesmen of al Shabaab, Abu al Amriki (2008) once said, "we welcome any Muslim from anywhere in the world who wants to join us, we will allow him to marry our daughters and share our crops...Many have died fighting for our cause, and others are here with us" (cited in Taaruby & Hallundback, 2010, p.49). The good aspect of this massage is that, al Amriki had informed an intended member that, many have died. Therefore, if you died, how would you get the wife or share the crops, which he had promised? International Crisis Group (2012) maintained that, the propaganda had inspired "members to travel freely between Kenya and Somalia and elsewhere in the region to build considerable infrastructure for recruitment, fundraising and communication among Somalia population in Nairobi, Mombasa and North Eastern Province" (p.12).

Apart from the propaganda and sophisticated media outlets, al Shabaab became attracted to its adherents in Kenya due to its strict interpretation and implementation of Islamic law. A state where men and

women are freely mixed is haram (forbidden) before Allah (God). There is a reason for all creatures to return to God, because the Day of Judgment is near according to the sect. Harnisch (2010) further explained that:
Al Shabaab administration... demand that all women wear the veil...demand that all men grow bears in imitation of the Prophet Mohammad...also required all business operations to halt temporarily during the call to prayer, which happens 5 times a day or else face consequences...the group had banned playing and watching soccer, watching movies, dancing at wedding parties, listening to music (including as ringtone) wearing of bras by women, branding of animals (especially donkeys). The group also strictly prohibits people converting from Islam and proselytizing for any religion other than Islam...(p.17).

Extremist that hear this Quranic prescription can go as far as killing in the name of religion. Most Muslims in Kenya were looking for opportunity like this, so that the Kenyan society would become purer and closer to the almighty Allah. Regrettably, the state became the victim of its implementation due to bad governance and weak institutions. The former leader of Nairobi Muslim Youth Centre (MYC), Sheikh Ahmed Ali (2012) even urged "Kenyan Muslims to reorganize their oppression and join the jihad movement. Ali said, Muslims everywhere should raise "sword against the enemy that is closest to you" (Anderson & McKnight, 2014, p17). The truth is that the state has a lot of blame. Kenyan Muslims feel marginalized due to their socio-economic conditions. True national integration is still a mirage in Kenya. Christians have benefited more than Muslims have. Since independence in 1963, no Muslim has been elected President in Kenya. Their children that have graduated from colleges and universities are roaming streets without work. The feelings of marginalization among the Muslim community is raising daily. Fathima (2009) equally argued that, "the root cause of youth radicalization in Coast, stems from the region's desperate economic, social and political conditions. Ineffective decentralization of development plans and governance issue since independence" (cited in Patterson, 2015, p.20).

Al Shabaab provided for the needy in the society and even assisted in establishing madrasas (Islamic schools) for their children. Though this madrasas concentrates on teaching the Arabic and Wahhabi doctrines. International Crisis Group (2012) further hinted that, "some operated relatively good health facilities or served as orphanages and feeding centres in the North Eastern Province and Coast Province. Some also taught vocational skills such as tailoring and carpentry" (p.11). The fact is that the state should have provided the basic education for all. Regrettably, this is not so in Kenya Education is expensive, therefore, the locals have to embrace al Shabaab who provides free education for their children,

and see state as their enemy. As Steinberg and Weber (2015) argued, "where states prove unwilling or unable to ensure security, enforce the law or distribute public goods, smaller entities often assume these roles in their place. The ethnic group, tribe, clan armed movement, smuggling network or jihad group take over where the state leaves a vacuum" (pp.7-8).

Impact of Al Shabaab's Violent Extremism on Kenya
The radicalization of Kenyan Muslim youths and the involvement of Kenyan government in the internal crisis of Somalia, especially her participation in the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) have resulted in the underlisted impacts.

Security Impact
Though al Qaeda in East Africa had attacked Kenya in 1990s, the unprecedented attacks, which Kenya had experienced since the fall of Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in Somalia, can be compared to none. Lind, Mutahi and Oosterom (2015) confirmed that, "since the start of Operation Linda Nchi in 2011 (terrorist) attacks in Kenya have increased... some of the attacks have targeted Kenyan security forces, who have responded with brutal force to the Somali population in North Eastern Province..." (p.10). It should be recalled that in 2009, al Shabaab members in Kenya attacked Dadajajabula Police Post and wounded policemen that were on duty. In 2010, the same sect, al Shabaab struck General Service Unit Camp at Liboi and injured many paramilitary officers, while others escaped for their safety (the Star, 2011). Again, in 2011, al Shabaab planted mines, including other explosive devices in Mandera town. The targets of these explosions were Kenya police and military personnel. However, the threat of al Shabaab was becoming a reality; Kenya was reluctant to intervene in an internal issue of Somalia. The kidnapping of tourists and humanitarian workers in Kenya by al Shabaab pushed the state to action. As stated by International Crisis Group (2012):
When several European were seized in the Lamu area in September and October 2011, the key tourism industry was hit hard. The last straw appeared to be when 2 Spanish aid workers with Medicins Sans Frontiers (MSF) were kidnapped in a Dabaab refugee camp near the Kenya-Somalia border on 13 October 2011 (the third incident in less than a month). Several days later, Kenya troops moved into Somalia (p.3).

Every responsible government must behave like Kenya, but the cost was too heavy for her to bear. Westgate attack that occurred in September 2013, is a lesson Kenyans would never forget. The weakness of Kenyan security forces was exposed and the death toll that resulted in that attack was 67. The late al Shabaab leader, Ahmed Godane congratulated his Mujahideen (fighters). In one of his last audio recording. "Emir

Godane discussed the Westgate mall attack in the context of what he called jihadist victories... He enjoined al Shabaab militants in Somalia to persevere as they...would prevail against "Christian invaders" from Ethiopia and Kenya" (cited in International Crisis Group, 2018, p.5). Another major attack occurred on 3rd April 2015 at Garissa University College, Kenya where 148 people were confirmed death, while 79 were injured. Wakube, Nyagah, Mwangi and Attree (2016) hinted that, "this attack marked a turning point. By now, not only Kenya but the world was stunned by the scale and cruelty of violence in Garrissa" (p.4). Similarly, Weber (2013) alerted that, "the attack appeared to reference the targeting of schools and students by Boko Haram, and was a clear signal that the organization has not been weakened by the death of its leader Godane in 2014" (p.24). Al Shabaab congratulated the attackers of Garissa University and issued a statement on 4th April 2015. The Islamist sect warned Kenyan government by saying:

Do not dream of security in your lands until security becomes a reality in the Muslim land, including the North Eastern Province and the Coast and until all your forces withdraw from all Muslim lands. We will by the permission of Allah stop at nothing to avenge the deaths of our Muslim brothers until your government ceases it oppression and until all Muslim lands are liberated from Kenyan occupation. And until then, Kenyan cities will run red with blood...the Kenyan public, will be the first casualties (cited in International Crisis Group, 2018, p.5).

Many other examples of terror attacks in Kenyan could still be cited, but the fact remains that President Uhuru's government responded with repression. Lind, Mutuhi and Ooasterom (2015) lamented that, "since 2012, a wave of assassinations has targeted Muslim figures – businessmen, traders and business leaders" (p.27). On 1st April 2014, the cleric of Masjid Musa Mosque in Mombasa, Imam Abubakar Shariff (also known as Makaburi) was assassinated. Makaburi's death was reported to Kenya police yet no investigation. On 13th October 2013, a radical Islamic Preacher, Sheikh Gumi Aboud Mohammed and 4 of his companions in Mombasa were killed. Again, on 12th July 2014 Shahid Batt, a business man, and a Muslim was killed by unknown gunmen in Mombasa (Boniface, 2014). Saleh Sheikh, an interviewee explained to International Crisis Group (2014) that, "every time a terror incident happens in northern Kenya, the towns are deserted fearing violent retaliation and collective punishment from security forces. Security forces arrest everyone on the street without discrimination," (p.10). There is a sense of disappointment and frustration from the general public concerning the state capacity to investigate and further prosecute criminal elements in Kenyan society. Instead of targeting al Shabaab and its sympathizers, the state resorts to collective arrest,

punishment and at times killings. Human Rights Watch (2014) also documented:

10 cases of killings, 10 cases of enforced disappearances, and 11 cases of mistreatment or harassment...between November 2013 and June 2014 mainly in Nairobi's Majengo neighbourhood. Suspects were shot dead in public places, abducted from vehicles and courtrooms, beaten badly by arresting officers, detained in isolated blocks and denied contact with their families or access to lawyers... (p.16).

Therefore, "lacking a legitimate political path to address grievances, some Muslims turn to religious extremism to effect change" (Patterson, 2015, p.20). Similarly, Sheikh Fuaad Khalat (2014) also urged all Muslims in Kenya to "take up arms and fight the Kenyan government," because it had "killed their children both inside Somalia and inside Kenya" (cited in International Crisis Group, 2014, P.56).

(ii) Diplomatic Impact

The trust and confidence the international community had in Kenya started dwindling immediately she supported the creation of Jubaland as an independent state within Somalia. Jubaland, though dominated by Ogaden and Marehan, there are other smaller ethnic groups such as Harti, Hawiye, Dir and Rahanweyn. Kisimayo is the headquarter of the Jubaland. It is the most economically viable area in Somalia, due to the presence of seaport. Therefore, the contest for it, is triggered by the economic interest. Anderson and McKnight (2014) further explained that, Ahmad Madobe, the leader of Ras Kamboni militia, Barre Hiiraale, the Commander of Juba Valley Alliance; another militia, as well as Kenyan Defence Force jointly fought al Shabaab in Jubaland until the Islamist sect was defeated in 2007. Ethiopia later declared interest in that region and gave full support to Barre Hiiraale, the Minister of Defence in Transitional Federal Government to take full control of the area for Somali government. Kenya being the major power that ousted al Shabaab from Kismayo instigated Ahmed Madobe to declare himself President of Jubaland in May 2013. As captured by Mohammed (2014):

In an effort to realize a regional authority in Jubaland and the federal Somalia in the long term, Kenya held a reconciliation process for local leaders and politicians from Jubaland region in 2010 and supported them to form a regional state in that part of Somalia. Kenya also trained local militias, recruited from communities of those regions to fight al Shabaab in Jubaland, this provide Kenya a secured neighhbouring environment (p.46).

As expected the Transitional Federal Government headed by President Sheikh Sharif was not happy with Kenya. The Kenya's action could complicate peace process and embolden Ras Kamboni as future elements of instability in Somalia. Erickson

(2013) hinted that, "the Transitional Federal Government views this, more to be undermining its roles as the central government in Somalia...but Kenya insists that process was relevant for its national security as well as the regional one" (p.35). The Ethiopian government also condemned Kenya's action and maintained that, "...any administration in Southern Somalia would need to have greater representation form other clans to balance the Ogaden" (International Crisis Group, 2012, p.12). Similarly, President Museveni of Uganda reacted negatively against Kenya's decision and also maintained that, "it apparently does not approve of Kenya's and Ethiopia's support to proxy forces and creation of buffer zones, arguing, such actions further weaken the Transitional Federal Government..." (International Crisis Group, 2012, p.12). Regrettably, "Kenya prioritizes protection of her national security over trying to resolve Somalia's conflict holistically" (Muhammad, 2014, p.45). The creation of Jubaland would serve as buffer zone for Kenya, and assist in smooth return of Somalia's refugees in North Eastern Province of Kenya. However, the economic interest of Kenya in Kismayo Port is a factor which only those in former President Kibaki's government could explain.

(iii) Economic Impact

Kenya is one of the poorest and underdeveloped countries in Africa. However, her involvement in Somalia's crisis worsen situation for ordinary Kenyan. The cost of maintaining its forces in Kenya was huge. International Crisis Group (2012) hinted that, "it is estimated that Linda Nchi is costing the government at least Ksh 210 million ($210 million) per month in personnel cost alone...Ksh 236 billion ($3.1 billion) budget deficit if the intervention cost is not contained...high inflation will spiral and local discontent could become more serious," (p.14). This could be the main reason while Kenya integrated its forces with African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in 2007, instead of operating separately. In the North Eastern Province, the economy of the region nearly collapsed. The way and manner operation Usalama Watch operated in Marissa, Mandara and East Leigh forced Muslim businessmen to relocate their businesses to neighbouring countries such as Uganda and Rwanda. The state enforced identity card policy for all the Muslim communities in the North Eastern Province. Those with valid identity card were forced to pay bribe before they could continue to stay in the Province while those without valid identity card were repatriated to Somalia (Lind, Mutahi & Oosterom, 2013). Saturday Nation (2014) cited in Lind, Mutahi and Oasterom (2015) posited that, "the East Leigh branch of a large Kenyan bank reported that the daily average value of transactions fell from Ksh 260 million before the operation to around Ksh 4 million in the weeks after the operation started" (p.27). The huge withdrawal from Kenyan bank attracted the attention of the National Intelligence Service (NIS), who feared that Kenyan economy may collapse. Kashim Hamed, a Muslim leader in Garissa told Saturday Nation (2014) that:

The operation constrained economic activities, ranging from the arrest and eviction of people who are important for commercial network to businesses losing workers, disruption of commercial activities, and the payment of the ever-more extortionate bribes to police on patrol...the operation led to decrease in rents and default on payments to banks (cited in Lind, Mutahi & Oosterom, 2015, p.27).

Al Shabaab violent attacks have led to Uganda's withdrawal from the joint oil pipeline construction project with Kenya. The project was proposed to start from Uganda and passed through North Eastern Province of Kenya to world market, using the Lamu Port – Southern Sudan-Ethiopia Transport Corridor (LAPSSET). However, Ugandan government later announced that it would prefer channeling the project through a northern port city of Tanga in Tanzania, instead of passing through Kenya. Uganda did not want to risk her multimillion-dollar project, as well as revenue from her newly found Tullow Oil in Indian Ocean. Regrettably, Watkins (2016) remarked that:

Although Uganda had earlier signed a tentative agreement with Kenya for the Homa-Lamu pipeline route it caused a stir in October 2015 by announcing that it had signed an agreement with Tanzania to consider the Hoima-Tanga pipeline route...that announcement coincided with remarks by Total SA CEO, Patrick Pouyanne that his firm was considering the Hoima-Tanga route due to security concerns about the Hoima-Lamu route... (p.11).

Paradoxically Kenya has benefited from the al Shabaab violent extremism. It should be recalled that Kismayo was the economic hub of Somalia, which was later controlled by al Shabaab before they were dislodged by the Kenyan Defence Force (KDF). The departure of al Shabaab from the Jubaland gave Kenya the leverage to control the economic resources of the area, and had full control of Kismayo port. Crouch (2018) recalled that:

Since 2011, Kenyan government under operation Linda Nchi has provided Kenyan Defence Force (KDF) personnel with highly lucrative access to the illicit trade in sugar and charcoal through its presence in Kismayo. Kenya Defence Force (KDF) personnel, the Jubaland Administration and the Ras Kamboni militia have all taken cuts of taxes on the sugar industry, worth approximately $200-400 million a year in imports from Brazil (p.15).

The occupation of Jubaland, especially the lucrative Kismayo Port and its coastal area is strategic to the economic interest of Kenya. International Crisis

Group (2012) added that, "there are believed to be potentially large and unexploited reserve of oil, off the coast of Kismayo and possibly inland as well in both North Eastern Province and Southern Somalia. All this stimulates Somali fears of Kenyan's intention in Southern Somalia" (p.10).

Humanitarian Impact

Since the intervention of Ethiopia National Defence Force (ENDF) following the emergence of Islamic Courts Union in 2006, Kenya has been the major host of Somali refugees and asylum seekers. Presently, Kenya accommodates about 800,000 Somalis in three camps in Dadaab County. These camps are in Dagahaley, Hagadera and Ifo, which are within Kenya's North Eastern Province. Kenya had domesticated both the United Nations Convention on Refugees and African Union Convention on Refugees, hence obliged to implement its contents to later. Despite being a member of these respected organizations, Kenya had closed its border with Somalia during the eve of the crisis, in order to prevent the influx of Somali refugees (Lindi, Mutahi & Oosterom, 2015). Kenyan government knew that the influx of Somali refugees into her territory would bring negative impacts on the state and its people. This affirmed Brown (1996) assertion, "that refugee is a result of internal conflict and it mostly affects the neighbouring countries" (p.592). In 2007, the then Assistant Minister of Internal Security, Onwe Ojode alleged that Dabaab Camps are the recruitment hub for al Shabaab. The government of Kenya also accused refugees of proliferating small arms and light weapons. Kamanga (2009) posited that, "refugees are blamed for the illegal importation into Kenya (and illicit export), sale and use in the commission of other offenses, such as homicide, cattle rustling, drug trafficking and carjacking (p.62). There is no doubt that Somali refugees could have some bad elements in their midst, however, Kenyan government has not been able to provide tangible evidence to support its claim. As Mogire (2003) cited in Kamanga (2009) there is actually little authoritative evidence to support the claim that refugee presence is the major contributory factor in the proliferation of arms and light weapons. The burden of proof rests on Kenyan government since its security agents screened and permitted the Somali refugees into the Dadaab camps.

In 2008, Farah Maalim, a member of parliament representing Lagdera and the local government representative of Dadaab Community accused the refugees of destroying environment; hence refused United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) permission to extend the refugee camps. According to Human Rights Watch (2009). They argued that refugees were destroying the local environment (by felling trees, cutting bush and particularly by grazing livestock on pastoralist land) and that the host community was not benefiting enough

from the United Nations and Non-Governmental Organization Presence in terms of economic development and employment opportunities, especially for unskilled labour...since then new arrivals have not been given plots of land, receive no shelter materials, and have no choice but to settle with relatives or strangers on existing plots of land...the need for new land is urgent. (p.16)

The local community is against the presence of the Somali refugees; hence, the argument that refugees destroyed their environment does not contain truth. The world know that Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia, infact the entire Horn of Africa is presently affected by drought and desertification caused by climate change. Climate change has done a lot of havoc to this region than any other part of the African continent. Therefore, where were the trees in the first place?

Kenyan government, further alleged that the presence of Somalis refugees in the North Eastern Province could led to demographic change. The fear here is that the North Eastern Province was already inhabited by Kenyan Somalis including few Arabs and Asians (predominantly, Muslims), therefore, with the influx of Somali refugees into the province, the region would have a high voting strength. This would affect the ruling tribes such as Kikuyu, and Luos who are Christians in national elections. As International Crisis Group (2012) put it, "demographic changes are closely watched, because they have direct political implications, a point brought home recently when an ethnic Somali, Yusuf Hassan, won the parliamentary seat in East Leigh" (p.2). Political reason could be the major factor for the discrimination as well as rejection of Somali refugees in Kenyan. However, the issuance of identity cards (IDs) could check the abuse of Kenyan electoral law that forbids foreigners from participating in Kenyan electoral process.

In order to curtail the impacts of the Somali refugees on Kenya, Uhuru's government has initiated series of strategies. Kenyan government has banned registration of new refugees into Dabaab Camps, forcefully repatriated some of the refugees back to Somalia, returned those residing in Nairobi and Mombasa back to Dabaab Camps and above all created Juba Camp in Somalia to accommodate the internally displaced people from the country (Lind, Mutahi & Oosterom, 2015). Regrettably, the unprofessional conduct of Kenyan Security Operatives, especially police remain silent. Government pretends as if the human rights of the refugees has never been abused. Human Rights Watch (2009) recorded the interview it had with a 17 years old girl, Somali refugee (name withheld) who was arrested for illegal entry into Ifo Camp. The girl said:
I left the cell to go to toilet but two policemen stopped me and told me to go into a room and lie down. One of

the men held down my arms and the other raped me. I was so scared that I couldn't even shout but then the second man wanted to rape me and I started to scream...they left the room, locked the door and left me alone for one hour. Then they took me back to the cell. The others asked me where I had been but I could not tell them. I was too ashamed. This is the first time I have talked about it (cited in Human Rights Watch, 2009, p.23).

Story like this reveals that Somali refugees are not the root causes of instability in Kenya, rather the state and its agencies constitute problem, hence, there should be a rethink since the world is watching.

International Responses to Al Shabaab's Violent Extremism

Unarguably al Shabaab is a well-known terrorist organization, whose impact have affected the international community negatively. United States of America had shown lukewarm attitude towards Somalia's crisis following the failed Operation Gothic Serpent of the Black Hawk Down that led to the death of her 18 troops in Mogadishu on 3rd October 1993. The new intention to intervene in Somalia's crisis came as a result of the 9/11 attacks and her global war against terrorism. According to Debisa (2021):
The United States was more alerted after 9/11 New York attack. It gave terrorism an international character. This was a turning point for the United States foreign policy, as the United States understood that it could not be safe because terrorism is posing threat across the world. The presence of terrorism in countries in the world directly or indirectly affects the United States and its allies' interest. To fight terrorism, the United States provided financial and logistic support to augment the capacity of states to fight al Shabaab (p.7).

In order to give her intervention, international backing, United States lobbied United Nations to declare al Shabaab, a terrorist organization, and further passed UN Resolution 1725 on 6th December 2006. The UN Resolution 2006 authorized, "a military mission to Somalia…to protect the Transnational Federal Government …among other tasks" (Hoeline, 2007, p.19). United States wanted to avert 3rd October 1993 incidence, hence opted for "African solutions for African Problems," which means that United States resources would be used in training Somali National Security Forces as well as supporting African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) for the fight against al Shabaab. Since al Shabaab constitutes obstacle to United States' economic, security and diplomatic relations with member states of Horn of Africa, and the entire East Africa, Ethiopia and Kenya were chosen for her military and strategic supports in the fight against the sect. Debisa (2021) stated that:
Other states in the region are relatively unstable to fight al Shabaab as powerful as Ethiopia. Sudan was accused

of hosting Osama bin Laden and other al Qaeda members and was among the list of states sponsoring terrorism. Somalia is failed and unstable state serving as a safe-haven for al Shabaab. Dijbouti on the other hand could not take the leadership of counter terrorism because of economic constraints...Eritrea was blamed for sponsoring rebel groups and purchasing arms to disturb the peace of countries in the region...Kenya is one of the partners of United States, it has been attacked by al Shabaab, several times. (p.8).

Hoehne (2007) further explained that United States designated al Shabaab a terrorist organization in March 2008, and attacked the group with air strike in Central Somalia. This attacks led to the death of Adan Hasi Aryo, the group leader and the subsequent emergence of Ahmed Abdi Godane, an ally of Osama bin Laden, as a new leader of the terrorist sect. However, the involvement of Ethiopia in Somalia's crisis was protective as well as defensive strategy. Brown (1996) had said, "conflicts spread quickly and create instability in the neighbouring states in a variety of ways, including transfer of weapons and cross border attacks" (p.591). In this case, it should be recalled that Ethiopia and Somali had engaged in war over Ogaden region in 1977 to 1978. The Eastern region of Ethiopia that shares boundary with Somalia had been contested by the two countries. The former President of Somalia, Siad Barre wanted to annex the Ogaden clan in Ethiopia into Somalia, in order to fulfil his ambition for "Greater Somalia", regrettably, this led to war between the two neighbouring states. Even the successors, especially Al-Itihad Islamiya (AIAI) and al Shabaab still had that dream of Islamic Caliphate that covers the entire "Greater Somalia." Therefore, "Ethiopia pursued its own interests and would have acted with or without United States approval" (Menhaus, 2004, p.3).

Confirming further, Muhammed (2014) hinted that, "the hostile history between the two countries followed by the nature of conflicts to "spill over" in nearby countries and affect them in different ways motivated the Ethiopia's involvement in the Somali conflict" (p.35). The Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) invaded Somalia, through its eastern border axis and evicted the militants. The Ethiopian troops also penetrated the Central Somalia and was instrumental to the fall of Mogadishu. The liberation of Southern Somalia was a combined efforts of Kenya Defence Force (KDF), African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF). Debisa (2021) further explained that, "al Shabaab was acting as a government before the counterterrorism intervention in Somalia. Through the combined efforts of Ethiopia, the United States, Kenya and AMISOM, al Shabaab was dismantled from its government status and Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was established in Somalia (p.8). Apart from the military intervention, Ethiopia

collaborated with the Somali's authorities towards political process in Puntland and Somaliland. "Similarly, Ethiopia has a good relationship with some of the influential warlords in Somalia and provided them military support to fight against the Islamists" (Afyane & Barise, 2009, cited in Muhammed, 2014, p.37).

Similarly, suspecting the spillover of the Somalia's crisis, coupled with the influx of refugees, into the North Eastern Province, Kenya decided to recruit 2,500 militants to protect her boundary with Somalia. These young men were trained by Kenyan Defence Force (KDF) at Kenya Wildlife Service Camp, Manyani. They were paid 600 Dollars monthly, and later deployed to Archer's Post, Isiolo, Jubaland in Somalia. This was a big mistake Kenyan government ever made. Lind, Mutahi and Oosterom (2015) maintained that:

Many deserted and returned to Kenya after facing the reality of warfare in Southern Somalia, others remained in Somalia, later joining forces that seized control of Kismayo Port...while others were recruited by al Shabaab. It is alleged to have offered monthly payments in excess of US$1,000 to fighters. It is feared that these same fighters have returned to Kenya and are involved in attacks by al Shabaab and other extremist groups...those who came back have nothing to do and now they are the ones doing the bombings. They are now mercenaries for hire (pp 23-24).

On 16th October 2011, Kenyan government officially deployed 1,500 Kenyan Defence Forces (KDF) personnel into Southern Somalia. The name of the operation was "Linda Nchi" meaning protect the country. Justifying the decision to intervene in Somalia, the then Internal Security Minister, George Saitoli (2011) hinted that, "Kenya has been and remains an island of peace, and we shall not allowed criminals from Somalia...to destabilize our peace" (cited in Lind, Mutahi & Oosterom, 2015, p.22). International Crisis Group (2012) also informed that Kenyan Defence Forces (KDF) invaded Somalia in order to prevent future kidnapping of tourists and humanitarian workers in North Eastern Province. However, Kenya had to intervene in order to protect its territory against al Shabaab and restrict future influx of refugees from Somalia. The Kenyan Defence Forces (KDF) recorded great successes in the Southern Somalia. Warner (2012) hinted that, the Kenyan troops liberated Gedo, Middle Juba and Lower Juba. Their greatest achievement was the capture of Kismayo and it lucrative port in collaboration with militias, Ras Kamboni. Upon seizing control of Kismayo port in September 2012, Kenyan Defence Force and allied Ras Kamboni militia found some 4 million sack of Charcoal worth at least US $60-64 million. Comparable stockpiles existed in other Somali ports, including Barawa, which was also under al Shabaab..." (Lind, Mutahi & Oosterom, 2015, p.24).

Regrettably, this war economy and its criminal benefits portrayed Kenyan Defence Forces (KDF) as untrained soldiers who are not fit for international peacekeeping. They are looters whose aims was to plunder the Somalia's wealth. It should be recalled that in April, 2014, the Kenyan Minister of Internal Security, George Saitoli launched Operation Usalama Watch (meaning Operation Peace Watch). The aim of this policy was to evict all illegal alien residing in Kenya, especially North Eastern Province. Government gave identity cards to those that they claimed citizen while many, especially Kenyan, Somalis, Arabs and Asians were repatriated forcefully from Kenya. The corruption that associated with Operation Usalama Watch was the worst in Kenyan history. Government deployed about 600 security operatives including police and soldiers to enforce the policy. Kenyan-Somali were forced out from most cities in North Eastern Province, especially Mandera, East Leigh, Garisa on the pretext of being illegal aliens. Lind, Mutahi and Oosterom (2015) recorded the complaint of a Muslim leader, Muhammad Abubakar who decried that, "Somalis are being harassed all the time. It is no longer a security issues but one of the extortion and it does not matter if one has document. The police are saying our identity cards (IDs) are fake, but it becomes genuine when one pays the money" (p.26).

The financial cost of maintaining troops in a foreign land was a big challenge. Kenya is a poor country with undeveloped economy. President Uhuru had to plead with Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to facilitate a process that will integrate Kenyan Defence Forces (KDF) into African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The African Union that was in need of additional forces had to heed to the Kenyan request and formally integrate Kenyan Defence Force into its fold. The UN Security Council also gave a quick approval for Kenya to be a member of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Apart from Uganda with 10,000 troops, Kenya was the second highest troops contributing country with 4,660, as far back as 2012, other countries such as Burundi, Djibouti, Sierra Leone and Ethiopia had less than 200 soldiers each. This lack of personnel has affected the operational capacity of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The worst aspect, is funding. As Warner (2012) hinted that:

African Union has had to rely on international assistance. As a result, funding for pre-deployment training, payment of troop allowance, logistic, support and reimbursement for contingent owned equipment have been ad hoc, insufficient, and often unreliable. Such financial problem have contributed to the inability of troop-contributing countries to secure the support they need in order to deploy to Somalia in a timely fashion, and they may also delay the arrival of the expected reinforcement...(p.113)

This lack of funding boosted al Shabaab's strength, and assisted the sect to overrun places such as Burduhule, Garasweyne, Eli, Ali Halgan, Middle Shabelle, among others that were liberated by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The truth is that European Union and United States have accused African Union of non-contribution, coupled with corruption allegations that associate with the military mission in Somalia. These two contributors decided to withdraw their financial assistance since, 2016 (Crouch, 2018). Again, apart from funding African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), European Union has contributed to the World Food Programme (WFP) for the refugees as well as embarking on training Somalia National Army (SNA) through its platform, European Union Training Mission (EUTM). It has also approved the establishment of Regional Maritime Capacity Building (RMCB), a civilian mission that would assist in training as well as developing Maritime Capacity of East African States. European Union war ship, Atlanta has patrolled the Gulf of Eden as well as Indian Ocean, thereby reducing the incidence of pirate attacks on Somalia's waters. However, Marangio (2012) decried that, "the performance of European Union...is more on top-down approach than on bottom up strategies... (p.13).

Furthermore, since the European Union has withdrawn its financial assistance to African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the expectation is that the burden of funding the mission would be carried by United Nations. Regrettably, United Nations, too, is having, financial challenges, member states hardly contribute or commit itself to any financial obligation. Despite this setback, the United Nations Mission on Somalia and Eritrea had blacklisted al Shabaab members and urged member states "to name and shame" them. "It was thought that making them part of the list maintained by the United Nations would highly affect the group's ability to obtain finances and other facets support from their domestic and international partners" (Tase, 2011, p.30). The United Nations has also supported African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) logistically through its office; UN support office in Somalia (UNSO). It has also been monitoring and reporting human rights abuses in Somalia, through its Special Envoy. Despite this, the United Nations had a big scandal. Peace and Security Report (2019) hinted that, "following the recent election-related crisis in south west state and the subsequent expulsion of United Nations' top envoy by Somalia Federal Government over accusation of interference in 2019 Somalia's elections...United Nations have seemed to be stained" (p.16).

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The removal of President Siad Barrie, former leader of Somalia in 1991, could be seen as the beginning of the current crisis, which Somalia is still facing on daily basis. President Siad Barrie removal led to the contest for power by various clan leaders, militias and violent extremist groups. It was this struggle that resulted in the emergence of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in 2006. The military wing of the group Al Ittihad Al Islamiya (AIAI) adhered strictly to the implementation of Sharia law in Somalia. Findings revealed that, it was Sharia implementation and its subsequent link with al Qaeda in 2007, which led to foreign military intervention in Somali. The Islamist group that later changed its name to al Shabaab, after formal alliance with al Qaeda confronted the foreign military, Ethiopian National Defence Force, Uganda Army, Kenya Defence Force as well as African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). This multiplicity of actors confirmed Kaldor's (2012) assertion on "New wars" that, "in contrary to the "old wars" in which states mostly organized the war and confront another state or groups formally, the new wars in the most present conflicts are involved by irregular groups; such as warlords, clan militias and other organized elements with different goals" (p.10). Allied forces were able to dislodge them from the Central and Southern Somalia. It was discovered that majority of them left to the rural areas, while some crossed border to Kenya and Ethiopia. As Brown (1996) had said that local conflict has potential of creating spillover effects to the neighbouring countries. Kenya bore the brunt in the areas of hosting refugees and loses caused by the violent extremist groups. The local dynamics of Kenya could not also help. Radicalization was easier since Sunni Muslim was already in Kenya coupled with the historic marginalization and the propaganda technique of al Shabaab. In 2011, Kenya launched Operation Linda Nchi, and also established Operation Usalama Watch in 2014; including creation of Jubaland in 2010. The United States, African Union, European Union and United Nations supported the fight against al Shabaa in various ways. Despite these efforts, Somalia is still unstable and Kenya risks future attacks.

In the light of this, this paper recommends inclusive dialogue. The world should not be deceived that al Shabaab can be defeated with military might. Somalia has been unstable since 1991, before al Shabaab emerged in 2007. It is a state that was controlled by non-state actors such as clan leaders, militia leaders and Islamist leaders, immediately after the overthrow of former President Siad Barrie, therefore, asking all these groups to surrender their powers to a western style of government (democracy), requires intensive talks. Corroborating this idea, Debisa (2021) also advised that, "working beyond mere military interference of counter terrorism perspective, would bring a better outcome. International partners and organizations should boost counter terrorism of all sorts emphasizing on soft diplomacy..." (p.17). In the same vein, Warner (2012) equally added advice that, "given that Somalia's sources of instability have

political and humanitarian dimensions, it is unlikely that military operations alone will stabilize the country and ensure Kenya's national security and territorial sovereignty" (p.15). Though warmongers and the crime beneficiaries may want al Shabaab crisis to continue unabated, it is important to note that Afghanistan has relative peace through inclusive dialogue with the Talibans. Al Shabaab shares the same ideology with Taliban and al Qaeda, therefore, there is no doubt that this suggestion would not work; since it has worked for Afghanistan. Even Crouch (2018) suggested that:
Considering al Shabaab's atrocities, political dialogue may be perceived as an uncomfortable and unpalatable option. At the same time, such peace building approaches are increasingly deployed in places such as Afghanistan where the Taliban are now being engaged... to find a political solution to conflict... international and local non-governmental organizations are increasingly working to reduce levels of violence and improve security in areas held under Taliban rule. In view of the dim prospects of ending Somalia's war through existing approach, such avenues should be closed off for Somalia (p.20).

Kenya should put its house in order. There is an urgent need for national integration. A society in which a section has an historic alienation and marginalization cannot survive in the new world order. The native, Kikuyu and Luos who have benefited politically at the detriment of other groups, such as Arabs, Asians, Kenyan Somalis among others, should remember that they are not immune to the current crisis. Terrorist attacks do not select victims, therefore, there is a need for second thought. "Certainly, the bigger threat today to Kenya's stability emanates from ethnic elites' winner-take all competition for political office, especially presidency... militants could still stage major attacks...such attacks would sap an economy...aggravate other sources of fragility and friction" (International Crisis Group, 2018. P.26). Though Kenyan government has started to devolve power in line with 2010 constitution, the truth is that the federal structure which they claim still discriminate against Kenyan Somalis and the Muslim community. Lind, Mutahi and Oosterom (2015) further stated that, "statements by al Shabaab and sympathizer militant groups and actors emphasize the humiliation and mistreatment of Kenya's Muslims by successive governments, suggesting that, this is an important motivator of militancy" (p.37). Therefore, Kenyan state should re-examine its discriminatory policy, open political space, employ Muslims youths and embark on massive development projects (electricity, road, hospital, schools etc) in the North Eastern Province where Muslims are majority. This would give them sense of belonging. They world appreciate government and identify the criminal elements among them. In the same vein,

Debisa (2021) equally advised that, "resolving social, political and economic problems, which trigger grievances and push individuals to join terrorist organization must be prioritized. If the government fails to fulfill public needs, people would use violence to compel the government. Similarly, they are easily vulnerable to recruitment by terrorist" (p.19).

Finally, international community should be interested in the geopolitics of the Horn of Africa, and the entire East Africa. Its proximity to the Arab world, and the Middle East should be a concern for all nations. States in Horn of Africa are weak, fragile and incapable of protecting its porous borders. Muslims communities in these states are closer to the Arabic nations than their home states. As Patterson (2015) stated, "many residents of Mombasa, Malindi, and Lamu (all in Coast Province) hold strong ties with the Arabian Peninsula than Kenya's own interior" (p.22). Radicalization is easier only when the ideology is implanted. Debisa (2021) further decried that, "...eradicating what is established in the social and psychological makeup of society is not easy...counter-terrorism effort should also emphasize...consolidating Islamic teaching that focus on peace...promoting and sharing good culture...that change the perception of people to condemn al Shabaab..."(p.19). This is where constructive engagement is needed. The United Nations should engage Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirate to mediate between al Shabaab and the Somali government. The reason why Saudi Arabia is chosen is because Wahhabism originated from that country (International Crisis Group, 2005). They are in a better position to explain to the world how different Islamic sects co-exist with this radical Salafi group. This would help in solving similar problems like, Boko Haram in Nigeria, as well al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in the Sahel region. In the same vein, the United Nations should implore United Arab Emirate to intervene in Somali crisis. The United Arab Emirate and Saudi Arabia were major trade partners with al Shabaab in 2007. They imported charcoal from al Shabaab through Kismayo Port. Anderson and Mcknight (2014) stated that, "before the invasion, between 20,000 and 40,000 metric tons of sugar entered Kenya form Kismayo each year, bringing al Shabaab $8000,000 in annual revenues. The principal export handled by these traders is charcoal, bounded for the creek of Sarjah in Dubai and the ports of Saudi Arabia" (p.9). Regrettably, despite the United Nations sanction, these two countries were still trading with al Shabaab. This means that they have close relationship. Somali government may see them as partner to the conflict, hence reject their mediation, but what President Farmajor should understand is that, al Shabaab is not dead but sleeping. It can wake up any moment provided the socio economic and political environment favours its resurgence. As International Crisis Group (2018) confirmed, "al Shabaab is likely to remain a threat to

East Africa. It is a formidable force in its home country, where prospects for its defeat appear remote"(p.27).

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