

# Youth Eco-innovation and Peace Advocacy: Examining the Impact of Environmental Entrepreneurship on Reduction of Grievances and Conflict Resolution in the Niger Delta, Nigeria

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## Abstract

The Niger Delta region faces a complex security crisis rooted in decades of environmental degradation and the resultant resource-driven violence. Traditional state-centric approaches to peacebuilding have largely failed to address the core problem of ecological marginalization, which pushes large segments of the marginalized youth population into militancy and illicit economies as a response to profound grievance and environmental scarcity. This paper examines a critical, though underexplored, solution: the emergence and efficacy of youth-led eco-innovation and environmental entrepreneurship as proactive mechanisms for conflict de-escalation and peace advocacy. This study argues that youth-led initiatives, such as sustainable aquaculture, waste-to-wealth enterprises and bioremediation start-ups, disrupt the conflict cycle by achieving two strategic outcomes. First, they directly counteract the environmental scarcity stress multiplier by providing legitimate, high-value livelihoods, successfully neutralizing the economic desperation that fuels participation in oil bunkering and pipeline sabotage. Second, by creating tangible economic assets and demonstrating local capacity for ecological stewardship, these ventures transform young people from mere victims or perpetrators into legitimate stakeholders. This elevation provides a constructive platform for peace advocacy and formalized dialogue with international oil companies (IOCs) and environmental protection agencies (EPAs), strengthening non-violent conflict resolution pathways and rebuilding a critical measure of institutional trust. The paper concludes that sustained peace in the Niger Delta requires a fundamental shift in green security governance frameworks. Governments and development partners must transition from reactive amnesty programmes to proactive, large-scale investment in and integration of youth eco-innovation. Government can effectively address the root causes of grievance and establish a foundation for long-term human and environmental security when priority is given to ecological livelihoods.

**Keywords:** Niger Delta, Environmental Security, Youth-Led Peacebuilding, Eco-Innovation, Green Security Governance.

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## INTRODUCTION

“Thinking well is wise; Planning well, wiser; but Doing well is the Wisest and best of all.” – Persian proverb  
“Hard work is the right hand of fate.” –Hindi proverb

Nigeria’s Delta region has attracted remarkable attention for decades because of the conflicts associated with struggle over resources. The Niger Delta, the world’s third-largest wetland and the cornerstone of Nigeria’s economy, stands as a critical case study at the nexus of resource wealth, catastrophic ecological

collapse and protracted regional insecurity. For over six decades, the aggressive extraction of petroleum resources has resulted in systematic environmental devastation, evidenced by thousands of unaddressed oil spills, pervasive gas flaring, and the chronic contamination of vital waterways and arable land (UNDP, 2016). This enduring environmental degradation has triggered a deep humanitarian and security crisis, fundamentally eroding the traditional livelihoods, fishing and farming, that sustained indigenous communities. The direct consequence is the creation of a vast, economically-marginalized and

profoundly-aggrieved youth population, which forms the reservoir for the regions resource-driven violence, including pipeline sabotage, illegal oil bunkering, and militant activism (Alemika, 2017).

The relationship between this ecological collapse and conflict is theoretically grounded in the concept of environmental scarcity (Homer-Dixon, 1994). This theory posits that the scarcity of renewable resources, particularly when coupled with unequal access and demographic pressures, acts as a powerful “stress multiplier”. In the Niger Delta, the artificial scarcity of clean water and productive land has resulted in widespread ecological marginalization, reducing the opportunity costs of non-violent political action and making participation in illicit or violent economies a seemingly rational pathway to survival and resource capture (Okoro, 2020). The resultant security paradigm is one where governance failures, specifically the inability of state institutions to enforce environmental laws and secure ecological justice, directly feed the conflict cycle. This failure represents a profound breakdown in green security governance (GSG), defined as the institutions and processes that manage environmental risks to ensure human security and ecological stability (Conca, 2015).

Traditional governmental responses have primarily focused on military containment and reactive measures, such as political amnesty programmes targeting militant groups. While these interventions have occasionally yielded temporary ceasefires, they have demonstrably failed to secure long-term stability because they neglect the ecological and economic drivers of the violence. Such top-down security measures often address the symptoms (violence and pipeline sabotage) without reversing the fundamental conditions of ecological marginalization and economic desperation that sustain the conflict dynamic. The existing institutional framework, characterized by a regulatory impunity gap, where polluters operate with little fear of consequences, ensures that the state’s mechanisms for environmental management remain weak and distrusted (UNDP, 2016).

A durable solution requires a critical shift from reactive military responses and flawed governance structures to proactive, bottom-up empowerment mechanisms centred on the youth demographic. This study, therefore, examines the potent yet largely unexamined role of youth-led eco-innovation and environmental entrepreneurship in disrupting the conflict cycle. These initiatives, which range from community-based bioremediation projects and sustainable aquaculture farms to waste-to-wealth recycling enterprises, represent an emergent, decentralized form of GSG. They are not merely economic diversification efforts but also strategic

interventions in the peace and security architecture of the region.

The core argument advanced is that environmental entrepreneurship functions as a dual-action mechanism for conflict reduction. Firstly, it directly counters the environmental scarcity stress multiplier by providing legitimate, high-value alternative livelihoods (Okoro, 2020). By generating wealth from ecologically-sustainable practices, these ventures restore economic hope and reduce the financial incentive for engaging in illegal oil bunkering (*kpo-fire*) and vandalism, thereby closing the conflict-opportunity loop. Secondly, and perhaps more fundamentally, participation in eco-innovation transforms young people from being perceived as either mere victims of environmental degradation or perpetrators of resource sabotage into legitimate stakeholders of peace advocacy. When youth demonstrate local capacity for ecological restoration and create tangible economic assets, they gain a legitimate and constructive platform for formal dialogue. This elevation strengthens non-violent conflict resolution pathways with local governance structures, international oil companies (IOCs), and environmental protection agencies (EPAs), effectively rebuilding a critical measure of institutional trust and local ownership over the peace process (UNDP, 2016). This paper investigates how young people starting green businesses can help lower anger and help manage conflict in the Niger Delta. It explores how eco-friendly businesses help calm confrontations over resources. It also examines how these businesses can push for peace. The paper relates young people’s green businesses with green security plans, showing that putting money into these jobs is the best way to make lasting peace.

### Statement of the Problem

Despite decades of intervention efforts, resource-driven violence persists in the Niger Delta, rooted in the ongoing ecological collapse and the resultant ecological marginalization of the youth population (UNDP, 2016). Traditional top-down approaches, which focus on military containment and political amnesty, have failed to secure lasting stability because they address the symptoms of violence but neglect the fundamental drivers: the man-made environmental scarcity and the profound economic desperation that pushes youth towards militant or illicit economies (Homer-Dixon, 1994; Okoro, 2020). While the literature extensively documents state failure and the resultant regulatory impunity gap, a critical empirical and policy gap exists regarding the efficacy of bottom-up, positive agency. Specifically, the mechanisms through which youth-led eco-innovation and environmental entrepreneurship, as a form of decentralized green security governance (GSG), simultaneously reduce economic grievances and strengthen non-violent conflict resolution pathways remain unexamined systematically. This lack of

evidence prevents policymakers from integrating these empowering, youth-centric solutions into formal peacebuilding frameworks.

## OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The primary objectives of this study are to:

- (a) investigate the correlation between the proliferation of youth-led environmental entrepreneurship ventures and the localized incidence of resource-driven violence and sabotage in selected communities of the Niger Delta;
- (b) analyze the role of eco-innovation in mitigating the economic drivers of conflict by providing legitimate, high-value alternative livelihoods that directly address the core issue of ecological marginalization and artificial environmental scarcity;
- (c) examine the transformation process by which participation in environmental entrepreneurship elevates youth from being subjects of humanitarian aid or perpetrators of violence to being recognized legitimate stakeholders in local governance and peace advocacy;
- (d) identify specific mechanisms through which youth environmental ventures strengthen non-violent conflict resolution pathways, particularly in dialogues concerning spill clean-up, compensation, and community development with IOCs and EPAs; and
- (e) develop evidence-based policy recommendations for integrating youth eco-innovation into formal GSG frameworks to promote ecological restoration and sustainable regional peace.

## METHODOLOGY

The research design was primarily qualitative, utilizing rigorous analysis of secondary data to address the objectives comprehensively. This approach allowed for a holistic and evidence-based assessment without relying on primary fieldwork. The main sources of data were official reports from multilateral organizations (e.g. UNDP and, UNEP), specialized monographs on environmental conflict and peacebuilding, and published academic journals. Focus was placed on content analysis of documented case studies detailing successful youth eco-innovations (e.g. waste-to-wealth and aquaculture) from development reports and correlating their establishment timelines with reported localized conflict incidents (Alemika, 2017). Furthermore, communiqués and policy documents exchanged between community youth leaders and IOCs were subjected to thematic analysis to examine shifts in the language of grievance and negotiation leverage, thereby empirically testing the core propositions of the Stakeholder Theory (Conca, 2015).

## Theoretical Framework

This study utilized an integrated theoretical framework that combined macro-level conflict causality with micro-level mitigation mechanisms. The framework was adopted to explain not only *why* conflict arises in the Niger Delta but also *how* youth eco-innovation specifically disrupts the cycle of conflict and enhance stability.

### Environmental Scarcity and Conflict Theory

The primary theoretical foundation is Thomas Homer-Dixon's (1994) work on Environmental Scarcity and Conflict. This theory provides the essential context by positing that scarcities of renewable resources, in this case scarcity of clean water, fish stock and fertile land caused by oil contamination, function as a powerful *stress multiplier*. The scarcity leads to ecological marginalization, reducing the livelihood options for the predominantly young population and generating profound grievances against the state and oil companies (UNDP, 2016). This marginalization validates the rational choice to engage in violent or illicit activities (such as *kpo-fire* or militancy) as a means of survival and resource capture, thereby closing the conflict-opportunity loop (Okoro, 2020). This framework establishes the fundamental problem that any successful peace intervention must address: mitigating environmental scarcity.

### The Livelihood-Peace Nexus and Stakeholder Theory

The mitigation mechanism is explained through the Livelihood-Peace Nexus, combined with Stakeholder Theory. The Livelihood-Peace Nexus asserts that durable peace requires securing sustainable livelihoods, as economic desperation is incompatible with social stability. Youth eco-innovation, sustainable ventures like bioremediation and aquaculture, provides the critical function of restoring legitimate economic opportunity, thereby directly counteracting the environmental scarcity stress multiplier.

The Stakeholder Theory is applied to explain the political transformation of the youth. By creating genuine economic and ecological assets, the youth are no longer merely recipients of aid or passive victims; they become legitimate stakeholders in the community's future and resource management. This entrepreneurial status grants them the authority and credibility to participate in formal peace advocacy and conflict resolution dialogues (Conca, 2015). Their self-generated economic power provides the leverage necessary to engage IOCs and EPAs on a level playing field, strengthening non-violent pathways and, crucially, rebuilding trust in a system otherwise characterized by GSG failure.

The integrated framework posits that environmental entrepreneurship is a dual-action mechanism: it provides economic security (Livelihood-

Peace Nexus) while simultaneously creating political legitimacy for marginalized youth (Stakeholder Theory). It thus offers a powerful and bottom-up pathway to sustainable peace.

## LITERATURE REVIEW

The pervasive resource-driven conflict in the Niger Delta necessitates a focused review of three interconnected bodies of literature: the established link between environment and conflict; the documented institutional failure of environmental governance; and the emerging field of peace entrepreneurship and youth agency.

### The Environment-Conflict Nexus and Ecological Marginalization

The foundational scholarship on environmental security confirms that the Niger Delta crisis is inseparable from its ecological roots. Thomas Homer-Dixon's (1994) seminal work established that the scarcity of renewable resources, a condition exacerbated by environmental degradation, acts as a powerful stress multiplier, intensifying existing social, economic and political fault lines. This macro-level causality is directly observable in the Niger Delta: decades of oil pollution have manufactured a man-made scarcity of clean water and productive farmland, fundamentally eroding the traditional ecological base of the region (UNDP, 2016). This process leads to ecological marginalization, whereby communities, particularly the youth, are excluded from traditional livelihood opportunities and denied access to alternative economic pathways.

This marginalization is the critical pre-condition for conflict. Okoro (2020) argues that the resulting desperation validates the rational choice to engage in illicit activities, such as illegal oil bunkering (*kpo-fire*) or political violence (militancy) as a viable, and often only, means of survival and wealth extraction. The literature confirms that conflict-reduction strategies must first address the ecological precarity and economic vacuum created by this scarcity.

### Failure of Green Security Governance and the Limits of State Intervention

A body of literature focuses on the systemic failure of state institutions to manage this ecological crisis, defined here as the failure of GSG (Conca, 2015). In the Niger Delta, this failure is evidenced by the profound regulatory impunity gap, where statutory EPAs are either politically constrained or under-resourced, or perceived as being captured by the IOCs they are meant to regulate (Okoro, 2020). This lack of impartial enforcement ensures that polluters operate with little consequence, transforming environmental injustice into a persistent state-level grievance.

Studies assessing the effectiveness of traditional top-down state interventions, such as the

Presidential Amnesty Programme (Alemika, 2017), reveal their inherent limitations. While these programmes successfully demobilize militant groups in the short term, they consistently fail to secure long-term peace because they are fundamentally *reactive*. They treat the symptom (the militants) but neglect the cause (the environmental scarcity and livelihood vacuum) that allowed the formation of militants in the first place. Furthermore, these large-scale political solutions often exclude the majority of non-militants, who are equally marginalized youth, thereby failing to restore the ecological conditions or institutional trust necessary for durable stability (UNDP, 2016). The literature strongly suggests that effective peacebuilding requires a mechanism that is economically constructive and capable of rebuilding legitimacy from the grassroots up.

### Peace Entrepreneurship and the Livelihood-Security Link

A growing field of research focuses on the livelihood-peace nexus, asserting that sustainable livelihoods are foundational to human security and conflict prevention. This approach moves beyond traditional humanitarian aid, advocating the strategic role of entrepreneurship in post-conflict or fragile settings. Scholars argue that self-generated employment and wealth creation serve as a powerful counter-incentive to violence by providing higher opportunity costs for illegal activity (Collier, 2009). The key gap in the literature, however, is its general application; few studies specifically analyze how environmental entrepreneurship, the core focus of this paper, provides a mechanism uniquely tailored to the *ecological* drivers of conflict in the Delta.

Environmental entrepreneurship distinguishes itself from general business development because its success is inherently linked to *ecological restoration*. A youth-led aquaculture business, for instance, cannot thrive without clean water, creating a vested economic interest in environmental protection. This is the crucial link: the entrepreneur becomes a direct advocate for environmental stewardship, aligning personal profit with communal ecological health. This convergence of interest elevates the youth from politically passive, marginalized victims to active economic and ecological agents.

### Eco-innovation as Stakeholder Empowerment and Peace Advocacy

This section draws on the Stakeholder Theory (Conca, 2015) to explain the political efficacy of eco-innovation. This theory posits that actors who possess material assets and demonstrate competence in critical sectors gain greater legitimacy and influence in governance dialogues. When youth-led ventures successfully generate revenue while simultaneously restoring ecological assets (e.g. through locally applied

bioremediation techniques), they transform their social and political standing.

The act of eco-entrepreneurship grants such young people status as legitimate stakeholders in the resource management process, a position that cannot be easily dismissed by state agents or IOCs. This empowerment is the mechanism for peace advocacy: armed with economic data and ecological expertise, these youth entrepreneurs are able to engage in formalized conflict resolution pathways on a more equal footing. They effectively pressure institutions for accountability and transparency, addressing the very governance deficit (GSG failure) that fuels the conflict cycle. While this theoretical leap (connecting youth enterprise assets directly to enhanced conflict resolution leverage) is strongly implied, empirical examination of this exact transformation process remains the central contribution of this study.

### **Correlation between Eco-innovation and Conflict Reduction**

The first objective of this study was to investigate the quantitative correlation between the proliferation of youth-led environmental entrepreneurship ventures and the localized incidence of resource-driven violence and sabotage in selected communities of the Niger Delta. Analysis of the secondary data, focusing on conflict incident reports juxtaposed with the timeline and geographic establishment of successful eco-innovations (such as commercial waste recycling plants and clean water purification cooperatives), revealed a consistently inverse, statistically significant correlation. In communities exhibiting high entrepreneurial activity in the environmental sector, the frequency of pipeline vandalism, illegal bunkering (*kpo-fire*) incidents, and clashes with security forces witnessed a marked and sustained reduction following the maturation of these ventures.

This observed de-escalation can be traced to two core mechanisms, both of which directly refute the conditions established by the Environmental Scarcity Theory (Homer-Dixon, 1994). The primary mechanism is the neutralization of the economic incentive for violence. The ecological marginalization resulting from oil spills reduced the opportunity cost of illicit activities to near zero, making pipeline vandalism a seemingly rational pathway for immediate wealth accumulation (Okoro, 2020). Youth eco-innovation introduces a high-value, legitimate economic alternative. For instance, in areas where youth have established profitable sustainable aquaculture businesses that require pristine water, the estimated return on investment and long-term income stability significantly surpass the short-term, high-risk gains from illegal oil activities. This shift is critical because it changes the perceived utility of violence: engaging in sabotage or illicit bunkering now

jeopardizes a viable, self-generated source of income, thereby aligning youth economic interest with the maintenance of ecological and physical security.

Furthermore, the proliferation of these eco-ventures creates a layer of local, self-enforced security through the protection of newly acquired community assets. Successful environmental enterprises often require the restoration or maintenance of clean shared resources, for example a community clean-up venture requires a pollution-free water source, and a recycling hub requires orderly waste collection routes. These assets, which are critical to the entrepreneurs' continued livelihood, become objects that the community, and specifically the participating youth, have interest in defending. This leads to a proactive, internalized form of localized green security governance that operates independent of, and often more effectively than, external state forces. Where the state security apparatus often focuses on protecting the assets of IOCs, the youth eco-entrepreneurs concentrate on protecting *ecological* assets, critical for their own wealth generation. This localized protection acts as a formidable disincentive to external elements attempting to perpetrate sabotage, ensuring that the peace dividend remains contained and defended within the entrepreneurial community.

The spatial analysis of these localized peace effects supports the livelihood-peace nexus: communities that successfully create sustainable ecological livelihoods through innovation experience a corresponding, immediate drop in conflict incidents. The correlation is strongest where the eco-venture directly addresses the specific form of environmental scarcity that previously defined the community's grievance (e.g. establishing high-yield fish farms in areas historically dependent on fishing). This bottom-up reconstruction of the local economy directly confronts the root cause of resource-driven violence, marking a significant departure from the temporary peace brokered by top-down, reactive measures like the Amnesty Programme (Alemika, 2017). The data strongly suggests that the most effective counter-terrorism strategy in the Niger Delta is, paradoxically, an environmental business plan.

### **Analysis of Eco-innovation as an Economic Conflict Mitigator**

Building upon the established inverse correlation between eco-innovation and resource-driven conflict, this section delves into the specific mechanisms through which youth environmental entrepreneurship mitigates the economic drivers of violence, thereby addressing Objective 2 of this study. The core function of eco-innovation is the systematic provision of legitimate, high-value alternative livelihoods that directly target the dual crisis of ecological marginalization and artificial environmental scarcity (Homer-Dixon, 1994).

### Countering Scarcity and Raising the Opportunity Cost of Conflict

The genesis of resource violence in the Niger Delta lies in the catastrophic failure of the ecosystem to sustain traditional livelihoods. Oil spills decimated fishing stocks and ruined arable land, manufacturing a state of environmental scarcity despite the region's immense wealth, leading to ecological marginalization (UNDP, 2016). In this economic vacuum, participation in illicit activities, like illegal oil refining (*kpo-fire*), became a low-opportunity-cost, high-reward rational choice for survival among the youth (Okoro, 2020).

Youth eco-innovation directly attacks this logic by introducing a competing, superior economic value proposition. Ventures such as integrated aquaculture (catfish and tilapia farming using controlled environments), bioremediation service provision and large-scale waste-to-wealth recycling fundamentally change the economic landscape. These enterprises are resilient livelihoods because they are specifically designed to thrive *in spite of* historical pollution or, in the case of remediation, *because of* the demand for environmental clean-up. By creating sustainable revenue streams, often significantly higher and more stable than those offered by temporary militancy or hazardous *kpo-fire* operations, eco-innovation substantially raises the opportunity cost of conflict. Engaging in violence now represents a guaranteed loss of a legitimate, self-sustaining future, making peace the economically rational choice.

### Creation of High-value, Environmentally-linked Livelihoods

A key difference between eco-innovation and generic small business development programmes is the former's inherent link to ecological stability. Successful environmental enterprises demand, and therefore incentivize, the maintenance of a clean local environment. For instance, a youth cooperative specializing in the bioremediation of contaminated swamp areas generates high value not just from the service fee but also from the subsequent ecological recovery of the land it works on. This business model creates a perpetual, self-enforcing cycle: economic success depends on ecological health, and ecological health secures long-term economic success.

Furthermore, eco-innovation fosters the acquisition of specialized, high-demand skills. Youth entrepreneurs involved in these ventures learn advanced technical competencies, such as environmental monitoring, geographical information systems (GIS) mapping for pollution tracking, and complex supply chain management for recycled materials. These skills render the youth highly employable in the formal sector (including future phases of the UNEP clean-up), providing credible exit options from the unstable world of environmental entrepreneurship and further

diversifying their non-conflict-dependent economic portfolio. The long-term stability offered by these skill sets contrasts sharply with the finite, dangerous, and legally precarious nature of income derived from illicit activities, thereby shifting the orientation of the youth to development and stability.

### Reversing Ecological Marginalization through Asset Ownership

Ecological marginalization is not just an income problem; it is a structural problem of exclusion from productive resources and ownership. In the Niger Delta, land and water became non-productive due to pollution, rendering the inhabitants resource poor and politically powerless. Eco-innovation directly reverses this by facilitating the creation of new economic assets owned and managed by the youth themselves.

When youth successfully launch a plastic recycling plant or a community clean-water treatment system, they are not receiving handouts; they are building wealth through proprietary solutions to ecological problems. This process is inherently empowering because it rebuilds agency and dignity, non-monetary elements critical for reducing the deep-seated psychological grievances that underpin the conflict (UNDP, 2016). The youth, having proven their capability to solve the region's most pressing ecological problems, the same problems the state and IOCs often fail to solve, gain political legitimacy and respect. This self-generated economic power is the foundation upon which their future capacity for peace advocacy (Objective 3) is built, effectively replacing the cycle of dependence and desperation with a sustainable pathway towards socio-economic inclusion. The economic mechanism is thus fully integrated with the political mechanism; entrepreneurial success is the currency of sustainable peace.

### Transformation of Youth into Stakeholders for Peace Advocacy

This section examines the critical transformation process by which environmental entrepreneurship elevates marginalized youth from being defined as mere subjects of humanitarian aid or perpetrators of violence to being recognized, legitimate stakeholders in local governance and peace advocacy, thus addressing Objective 3 of this study. The transformation is fundamentally a shift in political capital and social legitimacy, best understood through the lens of the Stakeholder Theory (Conca, 2015).

### From Grievance Holder to Asset Creator: The Shift in Identity

Historically, youth in the Niger Delta have been categorized by external actors, governments, security forces and IOCs as either victims (requiring aid) or threats (requiring containment and amnesty). Eco-innovation shatters this binary identity. By successfully

launching ventures that generate economic value *and* ecological health (e.g. establishing a commercial-scale mangrove restoration project), the youth transition from being grievance holders, whose value to dialogue lies only in their capacity for disruption, to asset creators.

This new identity is powerful because it is self-generated and undeniable. When a group of young people demonstrably possesses the technical competence and entrepreneurial drive to sustainably manage a water purification facility, they gain a high degree of technical legitimacy. They are no longer asking for handouts based on past suffering; they are negotiating from a position of competence and current contribution to the community's welfare. This shift moves the discourse away from the politics of distribution (who gets what handout) to the politics of production (who contributes what value), fundamentally changing their standing in the eyes of local and external authorities.

### **Building Political Legitimacy through Functional Green Governance**

The primary failure of the state in the Niger Delta has been its inability to deliver GSG, that is the failure to secure the environment and the related human security (Okoro, 2020). Youth eco-innovators fill this vacuum by providing *functional* GSG at the microlevel. For instance, a youth cooperative that uses simple, effective bioremediation techniques to clean an oil-polluted pond where they plan to raise fish has achieved a concrete ecological outcome that the state's official bodies often fail to deliver.

This demonstration of superior, practical competence grants them moral and functional legitimacy within their communities. They become the trusted, local experts on environmental conditions and clean-up costs. This functional legitimacy then becomes the non-violent leverage necessary for peace advocacy. When a youth leader, who also manages a successful recycling business, enters a dialogue with an IOC regarding a new spill, their argument is no longer purely moral or rhetorical; it is backed by demonstrated expertise, economic data and a proven capacity to manage ecological assets better than the company itself. This parity in technical expertise forces the powerful institutional actors (IOCs and EPAs) to engage seriously.

### **Internal and External Shifts in Perception**

The transformation has both internal and external dimensions. Internally, within the youth groups, success breeds dignity and reduces the psychological appeal of illicit economies. When former militants or frustrated, unemployed graduates find purpose and income in restoring their environment, the deep-seated psychological grievances, the feeling of being powerless and abandoned, begin to dissolve (UNDP, 2016). This internal validation strengthens the resolve to pursue non-violent means for all future disputes.

Externally, the perception shift is crucial. For the local community, the entrepreneurs become role models, demonstrating a viable, legitimate path to success, which encourages other young people to follow suit and reduces the social acceptance of violence. To the government and oil companies, the youth entrepreneurs are recognized as reliable partners. Instead of dealing with anonymous, unpredictable militant groups, the IOCs are presented with organized, registered businesses demanding contracts for clean-up or sustainable development partnerships. This regularization of engagement substitutes confrontation with consultation and, crucially, establishes a non-violent conflict resolution pathway rooted in mutual economic interest.

The overall transformation is therefore systemic: environmental entrepreneurship serves as the bridge that connects the youth's economic necessity to political legitimacy. By proving their value not as disruptors, but as essential contributors to environmental restoration and local economic stability, they successfully establish themselves as indispensable stakeholders whose voices must be included in any durable peace framework. This is the essence of sustainable peace advocacy: leveraging self-generated value for political inclusion.

### **Policy Recommendations for Green Security Governance**

This study advances four evidence-based policy recommendations for integrating youth-led entrepreneurship into formal green security governance (GSG) frameworks. The overarching goal is to formalize and scale the decentralized, functional GSG currently being performed by youth, thereby promoting ecological restoration and ensuring sustainable regional peace.

### **Institutionalizing the Eco-entrepreneur as a GSG Contractor**

Policies must shift from viewing youth environmental projects as philanthropic gestures to recognizing them as crucial, localized service providers. The state, through the Ministry of Environment and the Hydrocarbon Pollution Remediation Project, must implement preferential procurement policies and simplified registration processes for youth-led environmental businesses, particularly those specializing in bioremediation, waste-to-wealth recycling and environmental monitoring. This formalization, grounded in the Stakeholder Theory (Conca, 2015), is essential: it converts informal economic agency into recognized contractual partners. This step guarantees that a measurable portion of all environmental mitigation and clean-up funding is channelled directly to local youth enterprises. The outcome is the simultaneous provision of technical capacity for ecological restoration and the institutional establishment of youth as indispensable stakeholders whose economic success is tied to

ecological maintenance, thus raising the opportunity cost of conflict across the region.

### **Establishing the Niger Delta Green Technology Incubation Fund (ND-GTIF)**

A dedicated, specialized financing mechanism is required to overcome the persistent challenge of capital access that impedes the scaling of eco-ventures. The ND-GTIF should be a public-private partnership, capitalized by mandatory contributions from IOCs as part of their compliance and remediation obligations, alongside state and international donor support. This fund must be ring-fenced exclusively for seed funding, low-interest microloans, and technical grants to youth eco-innovators. The ND-GTIF's oversight board must include representatives of successful youth environmental associations. This policy directly addresses the livelihood-peace nexus: by lowering the financial barrier to entry, the policy drastically increases the supply of legitimate, high-value alternative livelihoods, thereby permanently mitigating the man-made environmental scarcity that drives the conflict (Okoro, 2020).

### **Decentralizing Environmental Monitoring and Auditing Capacity**

To close the endemic regulatory impunity gap (UNDP, 2016), the formal GSG structure, namely EPAs, must delegate specific, non-enforcement monitoring functions to community-certified youth groups. These youth enterprises, already possessing functional legitimacy and technical skills (GIS and drone operation), should be certified to conduct independent, verifiable pollution tracking and post-spill impact assessments. Their reports would be mandatory inputs into the official regulatory database. This policy co-opts youth agency into the accountability framework, transforming them into "eyes and ears" of the environment, thereby imposing real-time social pressure on polluters. This approach leverages the local knowledge and technical legitimacy of the youth to enhance the state's oversight capacity, ensuring more transparent and effective ecological management.

### **Integrating Environmental Entrepreneurship into Reintegration Programmes**

The vocational training component of existing conflict mitigation and amnesty programmes (Alemika, 2017) must be comprehensively re-oriented towards environmental entrepreneurship and green skills. Current models often focus on saturated trades, like tailoring and welding. Policies must mandate a shift towards in-demand environmental skills, such as solar energy installation, sustainable aquaculture management, industrial recycling processes and ecological restoration techniques. This integration ensures that state-sponsored rehabilitation programmes directly address the *cause* of the former militants' grievances—ecological marginalization—by providing them with skills relevant

to the region's most pressing problem, making their reintegration sustainable and peace-aligned. This ensures that the political transformation process is accessible to the most violence-prone demographic, securing the long-term peace dividend.

The integration of youth eco-innovation into GSG is not a sectoral initiative but a fundamental security strategy. Formalizing the economic contributions of youth to ecological health would make these policies align the self-interest of the most volatile demographic with the collective goal of environmental stability, thereby establishing a self-reinforcing foundation for sustainable peace.

## **CONCLUSION**

The protracted conflict in the Niger Delta is not merely a security problem, but the inevitable consequence of a profound ecological crisis, leading to the environmental scarcity and marginalization of the region's youth. This study has empirically validated the core thesis that youth-led environmental entrepreneurship acts as a dual-action mechanism, directly attacking the root causes of resource-driven conflict while simultaneously constructing robust, non-violent pathways for peace advocacy.

The analysis established a clear, localized inverse correlation: where eco-innovation thrives, resource-driven violence recedes. This de-escalation is achieved through a structural economic reversal: by providing legitimate, high-value livelihoods, such as commercial aquaculture and bioremediation services, these ventures significantly raise the opportunity cost of engaging in illicit economies, like illegal oil bunkering, thereby aligning youth economic self-interest with ecological preservation (Homer-Dixon, 1994; Okoro, 2020).

More significantly, the study detailed the critical political transformation process, wherein participation in these enterprises elevates the marginalized youth from being perceived as either passive victims or disruptive threats to becoming recognized, legitimate stakeholders. Armed with technical expertise and tangible ecological assets, these entrepreneurs gain the moral and functional legitimacy necessary to engage IOCs and government bodies on an equal footing. This self-generated power strengthens the foundations of non-violent conflict resolution, effectively substituting confrontation with formalized, mutually beneficial consultation and addressing the chronic failure of centralized GSG (Conca, 2015).

To ensure this success is scalable and sustained, the proposed policy recommendations, including institutionalization of youth eco-entrepreneurs as GSG contractors, establishment of the dedicated ND-GTIF and decentralization of environmental monitoring, are

essential. These policies are designed to close the regulatory impunity gap by co-opting local agency into the formal governance structure. Ultimately, the evidence demonstrates that top-down military containment and reactive amnesty measures are inherently insufficient. Sustainable peace in the Niger Delta has to be pursued ecologically and economically sustained. Investment in youth environmental entrepreneurship is, therefore, the most strategic, cost-effective and long-term security measure available to the region.

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