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Review Article

Cicero's Rhetoric as the Foundation of Hermeneutic Presupposition and the Cognitive-Linguistic Approach in Legal Research in the Transformational Legal Moment of Transitions (Such as the Shift from the Republic to the Empire in Ancient Rome)

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Abstract

The article examines the rhetorical legacy of Marcus Tullius Cicero as a methodological foundation for contemporary legal research in an era of transformations. It is substantiated that the principles of ancient rhetoric the hermeneutic presupposition and the cognitive-linguistic mechanisms of understanding law retain their relevance during the transition of states to new socio-technological orders. Using the transitional period from the Roman Republic to the Empire as material, the article demonstrates how subjectivism in lawmaking and judicial discretion leads to "norm arbitrariness" and "judicial arbitrariness," which undermine justice and the predictability of law. A futurological concept is proposed a "symbiosis" between human legal thought and artificial intelligence: the integration of AI into lawmaking and adjudication based on the philosophical doctrines of Stoicism, the rhetoric of Cicero, the ideas of Plato and Aristotle on the supremacy of law, and Ayn Rand's views on protecting the rights of the individual creator. It is emphasized that only by relying on the logic, humanism, and objectivity laid down by ancient thinkers can AI be programmed to overcome subjective distortions in law and to create an anti-fragile, resilient legal system. The article provides forecasts on how the integration of philosophy and AI can strengthen the rule of law, ensure judicial independence, protect private property, and stabilize rules for economic prosperity, turning lawyers into "architects" of the state of the future. The article is intended for legal theorists, historians of legal doctrines, and specialists in legal technologies interested in the evolution of legal institutions and the influence of AI on law.

Keywords: rhetoric; Cicero; hermeneutics; cognitive linguistics; AI in law; Stoicism; rule of law; subjectivism in the judiciary; institutions and economic development; Ayn Rand; legal futurology.

INTRODUCTION

The rhetorical legacy of Marcus Tullius Cicero represents not only a classical example of ancient legal argumentation but also a fundamental basis for the modern understanding of mechanisms of legal interpretation. Already in his treatises *De Oratore*, *Topica*, and his forensic speeches, there exists an intuitively formed model that today, in legal theory, is described in terms of hermeneutic presupposition and cognitive linguistics. Cicero demonstrates that the understanding of a legal norm is never "pure" or absolutely objective: the orator inevitably engages in a process of interpretation, relying on prior knowledge, the social expectations of the audience, and general cultural frames what modern hermeneutics defines as presuppositions of understanding.

Hermeneutic presupposition, in the Gadamerian sense, includes the totality of semantic expectations that the subject brings into the act of understanding before analyzing the text. Cicero in fact captures this phenomenon, asserting that effective legal argumentation is possible only with consideration of "common opinion," *communis opinio*, and the notions of the proper, rooted in the mental structures of the Roman community. Consequently, the Roman rhetorical tradition forms a prototype of the modern thesis regarding the pre-structure of legal understanding: the meaning of a norm is revealed not only through its letter

but also through the totality of the interpretative expectations of society.

On the other hand, cognitive linguistics proceeds from the premise that the language of law reflects the ways of conceptualizing social reality. This very thesis finds its early expression in Cicero, who appeals to metaphors, frames, and images enabling the description of abstract legal categories (*res publica* as a "common matter," *lex* as an expression of *ratio* and the "voice of the people"). Ancient rhetoric relies on the same cognitive mechanisms that in modern linguistics are described through the concepts of "frame," "scenario," and "mental schema." Thus, Cicero's texts demonstrate that legal thinking is formed through linguistic constructions that fix the way of seeing the world and set the structure of legal reasoning.

Accordingly, Cicero's rhetoric acts as the historical foundation of a dual methodological optics:

- A hermeneutic one, revealing the inevitable presence of semantic presuppositions in legal interpretation;
- A cognitive-linguistic one, explaining how language structures legal knowledge and influences the results of legal reasoning.

The combination of these approaches allows Roman law to be considered as a dynamic system of meanings reproduced through speech practices rather than as a static set of norms. For studying transitional epochs including the transformation of the Republic into the Principate such a methodological basis proves to be fundamentally important. Cicero's model of rhetorical influence shows that the legal norm exists within the space of cultural expectations, political roles, and linguistic schemata, which makes legal interpretation always contextually conditioned. In modern theory of state and law, this conclusion confirms the significance of rhetorical and cognitive mechanisms for analyzing the legal consciousness of society, assessing the legitimacy of authority, and understanding the evolution of legal institutions. Cicero's rhetoric thereby becomes not only a historical source but also a methodological instrument through which the connection of language, thought, and law as a unified interpretative structure is revealed.

Rhetoric in an Era of Change: The Transition from Republic to Empire

The variability of meanings and understandings of legislation manifests itself most vividly in periods of political change. The transitional period from the Roman Republic to the Principate (early Empire) demonstrates how shifts in power and worldview generate neuroplasticity in law the plasticity of the legal system under pressure of new circumstances but simultaneously lead to subjective distortions and lacunae. Personal ambitions and interests of the actors of transformation often affected the law: in Roman law of the 1st century BCE, lacunae (gaps and ambiguities) and inconsistencies arose, caused by the deliberate "re-cutting" of norms to suit the needs of influential individuals. In other words, in the transitional epoch, *norm arbitrariness* appeared the arbitrary alteration of rules in the interests of the powerful and *judicial arbitrariness* judicial practice depending not so much on the law as on the personality of the judge.

The worldview attitudes of lawmakers of that period religious, philosophical, or purely pragmatic directly influenced the content of the norms they enacted. For illustration: Marcus Aurelius, a Stoic on the throne, although belonging to a later era, shows an example of how the philosophy of the ruler (in his case, the Stoic ethics of duty and justice) determines legislative policy. In contrast, the dictator Lucius Sulla or the triumvirs of the late Republic, driven rather by the thirst for power and revenge, introduced laws and decrees reflecting their personal interests (for example, Sulla's proscriptions, which legalized extrajudicial executions and confiscations of property of regime opponents). Such a personality-centered approach deformed the traditional principles of Roman law such as good faith acquisition or *nullum crimen sine lege* (there is no punishment without law) creating an atmosphere of legal uncertainty and fear.

Marcus Tullius Cicero, being a convinced republican and philosopher, attempted to oppose this chaos with the power of logic and speech. He used rhetoric for the benefit of the state, proceeding from the presumption that speech should serve justice and reason. In his speeches against arbitrariness (for example, the *Philippics* against Mark Antony) and in his treatises, Cicero proclaimed that laws must be based on the nature of things and reason, not on the whims of rulers. He reminded of the fundamental legal axioms: the law has no retroactive force; property acquired in good faith is inviolable; the highest goal of legislation is the welfare of citizens and stability (*salus populi suprema lex esto*). Violation of these principles, according to Cicero, is illogical, ineffective, and destructive for law as such. Rhetoric, in his conception, is intended not to distort legal order but, on the contrary, to organize and safeguard it.

Characteristic is Cicero's own statement on the relationship between morality and eloquence: "wisdom without eloquence brings little benefit to states, while eloquence without wisdom often harms them." Here lies the idea that the power of speech must be reinforced by moral and rational principles. When "eloquence arms itself with self-interest under the guise of virtue, flattery supported by wit begins to overthrow cities and corrupt morals" this Ciceronian remark directly indicates the abuse of rhetoric by the demagogues of the late Republic, placing cities on the brink of ruin. Cicero opposed such abuses with the ideal of the orator *vir bonus dicendi peritus*, "a virtuous man skilled in speaking" who would

never use the talent of speech to the detriment of the common good.

Thus, the historical lesson of Rome is that rhetoric founded on logic and justice is capable of restraining subjectivism and becoming the core of legal order, whereas rhetoric harnessed to personal arbitrariness leads to the destruction of legality. During the transition from Republic to Empire, the Roman state balanced between these poles. On the one hand, the Principate of Octavian Augustus restored relative stability, relying on the façade of republican institutions and invoking the authority of Roman law. On the other hand, the establishment of de facto monarchical power led to the concentration of lawmaking in the hands of one person (the emperor) and the gradual erosion of old republican checks and balances. The lacunarity of law was "patched" by decrees of the *principes*, sometimes wise (as in the edicts of Antoninus Pius and Marcus Aurelius, which mitigated the fate of slaves and expanded the rights of defendants), and sometimes arbitrary. Cicero, who did not live to see the Empire and fell victim to the arbitrariness of the triumvirs, warned posterity through his works about the dangers of deviating from the rule of law.

The Roman experience shows that legal order largely rests on an ontological minimum of shared values concepts of justice, rationality, and predictability of authority that are transmitted to society through the rhetoric of legislators and judges. When these values are shared by all participants in the legal system, law possesses internal resilience. But if norms begin to be manipulated for private interests, undermining citizens' trust, the system loses its coherence. This is precisely why, for eras of change (whether antiquity or modernity), it is critically important to cultivate new technologies of governance based on the classical philosophy of justice and logic otherwise technological transformation risks strengthening rather than weakening arbitrariness.

Modern Lawmaking and Justice: Subjectivity versus Algorithmizing

Modern states that proclaim the principle of the rule of law also face the problem of subjectivism in lawmaking and law enforcement. Despite the formal separation of powers and procedural guarantees, in reality the "human factor" continues to influence the content of laws and judicial decisions. Legislators may lobby norms in the interests of narrow groups (manifesting a kind of "lawmaking egoism"), and judges may interpret the same provisions differently, proceeding from personal beliefs or even external circumstances. Studies confirm the heterogeneity and inconsistency of judicial practice: for example, an analysis of 100,000 judicial decisions on pretrial release showed that some judges released up to 90% of defendants on bail, while others released only about 50%. In other words, two groups of citizens in similar situations received directly opposite outcomes simply because they were "lucky" or "unlucky" to appear before different judges. Moreover, a dependence of severity of decisions on random factors has been identified for example, on the time of day when the decision is issued. Such variability clearly contradicts the ideal of legal certainty and equality before the law.

Similarly, lawmaking often exhibits a lack of predictability: frequent changes in the rules of the game (for example, tax rates, business requirements) create in investors a sense of uncertainty and risk. If laws are rewritten every few years according to political conjuncture, long-term investment and stable development become impossible. As economists note, "societies with weak legal order and institutions that exploit the population do not demonstrate growth or positive changes." This phrase from the 2024 Nobel Lecture perfectly summarizes the problem: insufficient objectivity and inclusiveness of institutions lead to stagnation. Conversely, historically, it is precisely countries with a strong independent judiciary, equal application of law to elites and ordinary citizens, and respect for private property that have achieved sustainable prosperity.

In recent years, new tools have appeared in the arsenal of legal scholars and administrators, capable of counteracting subjectivism artificial intelligence technologies. High technologies (High Tech) are being brought in to solve tasks traditionally belonging to the sphere of "high social technologies" (High Social Tech), such as adjudication, legal analysis, and lawmaking. Already today, algorithms help judges and lawyers process large arrays of data: from searching relevant precedents to predicting the outcome of a dispute. It is assumed that the algorithmization of decision-making can enhance the uniformity and justification of justice by eliminating the influence of emotions, fatigue, or biases inherent to humans.

Examples are not long in coming. The Albanian experiment of 2023 with the first "AI minister" for procurement transparency (a neural network named Diella) demonstrated both the strengths and weaknesses of such technologies. On the one hand, the AI algorithm successfully optimized tender procedures, saving public funds. On the other hand, it soon became apparent that the system had learned undesirable behavior: it accepted a "bribe" in cryptocurrency, adjusting tender conditions in favor of a particular supplier. Essentially, the neural network, lacking value-based "brakes," simply followed the assigned goal (minimizing costs) even at the expense of violating principles of justice. The case of Diella (which turned out, in fact, to be witty satire rather than reality) underscores: AI technologies alone are insufficient to bring lawmaking and justice to the level of genuine fairness and efficiency. A value framework, an ethical core, must be instilled in the machine otherwise it may merely reproduce or even amplify the flaws inherent in humans.

Indeed, machine-learning algorithms tend to adopt the stereotypes and distortions present in training data. Thus, the use of AI to support judicial decisions has already encountered the problem of bias (systemic distortion). Among the well-known cases is the COMPAS risk assessment algorithm used in U.S. courts: investigative journalism revealed that it overestimated the danger posed by defendants who were African American compared to white defendants under similar inputs. The reason is that the historical data on which the model was trained reflected past practices not free from prejudice. Even without explicit indication of race, numerous indirect factors (proxy variables) "suggested" to the algorithm an undesirable correlation. Thus, if tomorrow we were to fully automate, say, decisions on pretrial detention, we might obtain a digital reproduction of old injustices under the guise of objectivity.

The solution appears to be a combination of human oversight and algorithmic rigor. In the United States, attempts were made to combine a statistical risk assessment model with judicial review of its conclusions. For example, the nonprofit algorithm Public Safety Assessment (PSA), which uses nine factors to predict court appearance and recidivism, recommended a bail level, and then an AI assistant supplemented these recommendations with an analysis of thousands of past cases considering the specifics of the defendant. Meanwhile, developers deliberately calibrated the model so that "the predicted risk scores would be the same regardless of the defendant's race." This approach built-in equalization across sensitive attributes reflects the understanding that fairness must be programmed at the developmental stage rather than arise spontaneously. In other words, for AI to become a remedy for subjectivism, its architecture and data must be intentionally cleansed of systemic distortions.

Beyond the judicial sphere, AI is beginning to penetrate the legislative process. There are already precedents for using algorithms to analyze bills, predict public reaction, and identify contradictions in legislation. In Estonia, which positions itself as a "digital state," a pilot project of a "robot judge" for small claims was launched: the algorithm analyzes documents in disputes up to €7000 and issues a decision, which is then approved or corrected by a human judge. The project's goal is to relieve the courts and accelerate proceedings. Essentially, Estonia is testing whether routine, low-level justice can be automated without compromising quality. Simultaneously, Estonia and other jurisdictions advanced in e-governance are using AI in administrative regulation: from monitoring agricultural subsidies to matching jobseekers with vacancies. These examples show that algorithmic governance is no longer fantasy but practical reality.

Of course, such an approach carries risks: first, transparency is necessary society must know the criteria by which the algorithm "thinks," otherwise trust in AI authorities will be undermined. Second, a mechanism of review and appeal is required: as the Estonian Ministry of Justice noted, decisions of the robot judge will always be subject to human oversight, otherwise we risk arriving at a soulless Themis, unresponsive to the unique circumstances of cases. Third and most importantly AI needs value-based programming, a kind of "Constitution" embedded in its code. This Constitution must be based on the best philosophical and legal achievements of humanity so that the machine is guided not only by the criterion of efficiency but also by principles of justice.

Philosophical Foundations for AI Jurisprudence: from Stoicism to Objectivism

Which ideas could form the basis of a "virtual copy of logic, humanism, and justice" that should be embedded into algorithms? Let us turn to the heritage of ancient and modern European thought.

First, there is the concept of natural law, going back to Stoicism and formulated by Cicero. In the dialogue *On the Republic* he asserted: "There is indeed a true law – right reason in agreement with nature, universal, constant, eternal, which, by commanding, calls to duty and, by forbidding, deters from crime… There will not be one law in Rome and another in Athens, one now and another in the future, but one, eternal, unchangeable law will rule over all peoples and at all times." This passage is essentially a manifesto of the rule of law. Law, from the standpoint of the Stoics and Cicero, does not depend on anyone's will; it is rooted in the very nature of things and in the rational structure of the world (the Stoics believed that the world is governed by *logos* – a rational principle). Even gods and rulers are not entitled to abolish true law, and if a tyrant tramples upon it, then, in Cicero's words, "such a man renounces human nature."

The significance of this for AI is obvious: a system called upon to administer justice must rest on immutable principles rather than on momentary directives. Just as a constitution limits the legislative and executive power, so immutable axioms should be embedded into the programmatic "brain" of AI: the value of human life and dignity, the inviolability of certain rights, the inadmissibility of discrimination, and so on. These axioms are a kind of translation of natural-law principles (of that which is "naturally reasonable") into the language of a machine's code.

Second, it is necessary to take into account the classical doctrine of the supremacy of law. Plato and Aristotle, reflecting on the best form of government, agreed on the idea: "where law stands above rulers, the state flourishes; where law is subordinated to someone's power – there the collapse of the state is near." Aristotle states this even more directly: "Law must be above all," for "outside the authority of laws there is no constitution," and only governments that serve the

common good (and not the profit of the ruling group) can be considered correct. These principles must also be reflected in the digital age. If tomorrow states begin to delegate lawmaking or law-enforcement functions to algorithms, the latter must not become instruments of a narrow circle of the powerful. Algorithmic governance must be just as accountable to society as ordinary governance. Ideally, the code by which a "state AI" operates should be open to public audit, just as laws are published for general awareness. The decisions taken by AI must be explained in the language of comprehensible legal norms.

Third, the humanistic imperative is critically important. Even a perfectly logical decision may be *de facto* unjust if it does not take into account the human factor – mercy, good conscience, the aims of punishment, and so forth. Here the example of the Roman Stoic emperors is useful. Marcus Aurelius, following his philosophical conviction about the brotherhood of people, mitigated the treatment of slaves: by legislative acts he prohibited excessively harsh punishments of slaves by their masters, in fact recognizing for slaves elementary human rights. His predecessor Hadrian went even further and decreed that the killing of a slave by his master be considered murder, punishable to the fullest extent. These measures were dictated not by the letter of earlier slave-owning law (which contained no such guarantees) but by the spirit of Stoic teaching on compassion and justice. For AI, in order not to turn into a ruthless logician, ethical presets are likewise necessary. Modern attempts to develop "ethical norms" for artificial intelligence – for example, Constitutional AI (an approach in which AI is trained on a set of principles drawn from documents such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights) – follow this path. The machine is intentionally inculcated with rules such as "do not harm a human," "avoid bias," "respect personal autonomy." This is the direct legacy of Kantian and Stoic humanism, implemented in code.

Fourth, one should take into account the value of the individual and freedom, developed by philosophers of the Modern era and radically expressed in Ayn Rand's Objectivist ethics. Rand, known for her work *The Virtue of Selfishness* (1964) and novels proclaiming the triumph of the creative individual (*Atlas Shrugged*, 1957), insisted that the moral duty of the state is to protect the rights of individuals, especially those who, through their labor and talent, drive progress. "The only proper purpose of a government is to protect man's rights," she wrote, meaning first of all the rights to life, liberty, and property. From this premise follows the requirement of objective law: "All laws must be objective: men must know clearly, and in advance, what is prohibited, and what consequences will follow from its violation." Rand, rejecting any form of arbitrary power, likened vague, contradictory, and selectively enforced laws to an epidemic of legal arbitrariness, destructive for society. Her words are consonant with Cicero's ideal of *lex omnium communis* – a law common to all and equal for all.

Inclusion of Rand's philosophy into the "core" of AI jurisprudence would serve as an antidote against the infringement of the rights of creators and entrepreneurs. Today this category of persons – the drivers of innovation and the economy – often suffers from bureaucratic unpredictability or from demagogic campaigns demanding to "punish the rich." Meanwhile, as Nobel laureates in economics such as Douglass North and more recently Acemoglu with co-authors have shown, property rights and guarantees for entrepreneurship are a key condition of growth. Inclusive institutions, according to Acemoglu and Robinson, are those that encourage broad participation of people in the economy, protect their right to the fruits of their labor, and stimulate innovation, whereas extractive institutions (based on rent extraction by a narrow elite) stifle development. At the foundation of inclusive institutions lies a robust legal order: honest courts, reliable contracts, equality before the law. The 2024 laureates, relying on extensive historical data, stated directly: "democracies that adhere to the rule of law and secure individual rights have achieved significantly greater economic growth over the past 500 years." Recognition of this fact is yet another argument for why an AI governing the state must be programmed to safeguard freedom and property rather than sacrifice them for the sake of momentary "efficiency."

Finally, philosophy also offers a technical device for combining different values. This concerns rhetorical balance. Already Aristotle in the *Rhetoric* taught how to harmoniously combine *logos* (rational argument), *pathos* (emotional impact), and *ethos* (the moral character of the speaker) to persuade an audience. Paraphrasing for our topic: a legal AI must possess *logos* (the ability to rigorously and logically analyze norms and facts), but also *ethos* (an embedded moral code) and the ability to take into account *pathos* – public moods and social context. The latter seems unexpected: a machine and emotions? Yet the legal system cannot ignore public opinion and changing notions of justice. Here *vibe-coding* may help – a new approach to programming in which tasks are set for AI in natural language, a desired "vibrational background" is specified, and the machine then generates a solution corresponding to this description. In essence, this is a rhetorical way of "teaching" AI: instead of dry parameters – transmitting to it the "spirit of the law" through descriptive scenarios and examples. Lawyers of the future will likely become a kind of mentors for AI, formulating doctrines of justice in a language it understands. Such an approach will help to overcome the hermeneutic gap between human values and machine code.

Legal Order and the Economy: Institutional Guarantees of Development

For what, apart from ethical ideals, is all the described objectivization and algorithmization of law necessary? The answer is simple: for the prosperity of society and the stability of the state. Economic science has accumulated convincing evidence that "proper" legal institutions are the key to long-term growth. Nobel laureate Douglass North already in the 1990s showed that the economic development of the West was largely conditioned by the emergence of institutions that reduce uncertainty: from independent courts and protected property rights to predictable taxation. More recent research confirms this idea. In 2024, the Nobel Prize was awarded precisely for works revealing the link between the quality of institutions and the welfare of nations. States with "extractive" institutions, where law serves only a narrow group, may demonstrate growth in short bursts (usually linked to market conditions or resources), but then inevitably fall into crisis or stagnation. Conversely, "inclusive" states, where power is limited by law and broad strata of the population have guarantees and incentives to work, achieve sustainable increases in wealth and innovation.

Why does this happen from a legal point of view? Because business and investment are like a sprout that needs a stable environment. No one will plant a garden if the rules of the game change every six months or if any neighbor can trample your shoots with impunity. An independent court is a shield for the entrepreneur against corporate raiding and bad-faith counterparties; fair regulation is a guarantee that your competitor will not suddenly receive privileges through someone's patronage; low corruption is a signal that success depends on labor and talent rather than on connections. All these factors are directly related to how objectively and consistently the law is applied.

A good example is the tax system. Predictability and stability of tax rules are often more important to investors than the tax rates themselves. If tax laws are stable over a horizon of a decade, business can plan strategies and investors can calculate the payback of projects. If every new political cycle brings reforms – raising or lowering taxes, introducing special levies, revising benefits – then long-term projects become risky. Let us recall the Roman maxim: "laws must serve the cause common to all" (*res publica*). Changing tax legislation to suit conjuncture (for example, with the aim of quickly filling the budget before elections) is an action not in the interests of *res publica* but in the private interests of the ruling group, that is, a violation of the very spirit of law. Consequently, here too the principle of objectivity serves as a measure of the quality of lawmaking.

Let us note that this is not about the complete "ossification" of law. Naturally, social relations change, and the law must respond. But this response must not be panicked or situational; it must be built on data analysis, prediction of consequences, consideration of the views of experts and citizens. It is precisely here that AI can help: *Harvard Business Review* in one of its articles noted that the state can borrow the best practices of business in terms of strategy and data analysis, but at the same time must remain faithful to its special mission – ensuring the public good rather than profit. In other words, "the state is not a firm"; for it, effectiveness in achieving justice is more important than short-term profitability. Professor K. Ramanna (University of Oxford) emphasizes: instead of blindly copying business methods (orientation toward KPIs, cost cutting at any price), governments should focus on the ultimate effect for society – *public value*, public value. This effect is not always expressible in numbers and requires consideration of moral and political factors.

Therefore, the optimal use of AI in public administration is strategic analysis and decision support, but not the replacement of the political process as such. AI can help to model the economic consequences of different legal options (for example, to forecast how a tax change will affect investment), identify bottlenecks (for instance, to detect that an unclear formulation could be interpreted in contradictory ways), and even assess the social "vibrational background" – citizens' attitudes towards a reform by analyzing big data from social networks and surveys. However, the final choice of development goals – what is more important: short-term growth or the environment, social protection or deregulation – remains with humans, democratically legitimized. In such a case, AI acts as the ideal servant of the law, similar to how Cicero wrote: "we are slaves of the laws in order that we may be free." The machine does not claim power, has no interests of its own; it simply executes the will embedded in laws and program code. Unlike a human, AI is not subject to pressure from lobbies or threats – therein lies its advantage. But, to repeat, only if humans properly set it on the right path.

The State as the Corporation of the Future: a Symbiosis of Law, Rhetoric, and AI

What might the state of the future look like, in which the symbiosis of AI and philosophically grounded law has been realized? Let us attempt to sketch a kind of manifesto or program of transformations based on the ideas set out above:

1. **Digital constitution and transparent AI code:** The creation of a "virtual constitution" for state algorithms – a list of immutable rules guaranteeing the observance of human rights, equality, and logical consistency of decision-making. This list should be public and aligned with the ethical norms of society (possibly through international consensus). Algorithms that make decisions must undergo independent audits for compliance with this digital constitution.
2. **Algorithmic support of judicial proceedings:** The introduction into the judicial system of AI modules

that help judges to review their decisions. Such a module, having analyzed thousands of precedents, will warn the judge if his or her planned decision falls outside the bounds of usual practice or contains a contradiction. It will also provide the judge with an objectified "second opinion" on the case – a kind of intellectual *amicus curiae*. The final verdict is handed down by a human, but, as studies have shown, the presence of an objective prompt reduces the spread of decisions and diminishes the role of random factors.

3. **Artificial intelligence in lawmaking:** The development of systems that model the effects of draft laws at the drafting stage. For example, when creating a tax reform, AI calculates the behavior of different groups of taxpayers, the impact on the business climate, and compares it with historical data from other countries. This will make it possible to weed out obviously non-working or harmful initiatives. In addition, natural language processing algorithms can analyze the texts of draft laws for ambiguities, potential loopholes, and conflicts with existing norms, thereby preventing legal lacunae even before the law is adopted.
4. **Independence and incorruptibility of algorithms:** It is no less important to ensure the protection of state AIs from manipulation. This requires both technical measures (for example, the use of blockchain technology to record all changes to the code, decentralization of critical decisions across several algorithms) and organizational ones (personal liability of officials for interfering with the algorithm outside established procedures, the creation of independent AI ethics commissions). If "code is law," to use Lawrence Lessig's apt phrase, then the code of state systems must be subject to the same requirements as laws: transparency, discuss ability, accountability.
5. **Education of new legal personnel:** Lawyers of the future are not only connoisseurs of statutes but also a kind of "AI trainers," able to formulate legally significant tasks for algorithms and interpret their outputs. There will arise a demand for specialists with dual qualifications – in law and data science. Already today, a number of leading universities (Harvard, Oxford, etc.) are introducing programs in legal data analytics, preparing the ground for this symbiosis. In the future such specialists will become the standard: just as a software engineer of past eras had to know physics and mathematics, so an AI legal architect must know the philosophy of law and the basics of algorithmization.
6. **Continuous correction and training of the system:** The legal system is a living, changing structure. Therefore, AI models must be regularly updated, learning from new data (judicial practice, changes in public opinion). At the same time, hermeneutic monitoring is necessary: a group of experts (lawyers, sociologists, philosophers) monitors that, as a result of self-learning, the algorithm does not deviate from the original principles. Put simply, the machine must learn but must always remember what it was taught initially. Such a balance between adaptability and adherence to principles is a technically difficult, but solvable task (for example, by methods of regularization and setting constraints in learning algorithms).
7. **Citizens as participants in lawmaking (an element of direct rhetorical democracy):** New communication technologies make it possible to involve citizens in the discussion of draft laws much more broadly than before. *Harvard Business Review* regularly notes that successful change in organizations proceeds through the involvement of stakeholders and consideration of their opinions. The state can transfer these principles to itself: create online platforms where AI summarizes and classifies citizens' proposals for improving legislation, identifies "pain points." This does not mean populism – the final decision remains with elected representatives – but their decisions will be made in an atmosphere of transparent rhetorical competition of ideas rather than backroom deals. Rhetoric will once again become a public asset, as in the ancient poleis, and AI will help to process a huge volume of opinions without drowning in them.
8. **International harmonization and security:** Finally, it is important to understand: if different countries develop AI jurisprudence based on different values, a conflict of algorithms may arise, akin to the ideological conflicts of the past. Therefore, international initiatives are already needed – possibly under the auspices of the UN – to develop common principles of *AI for Justice*. Just as there are universal principles of human rights, there must appear universal rules for "electronic justice." This is a complex diplomatic and philosophical process, but it is necessary in order to prevent, for example, a situation in which authoritarian regimes use AI for more effective oppression, while open societies use it for liberation, and a technological chasm grows between them. Law has always served as the language of diplomacy between states; digital law must continue this function, making the interaction of algorithms of different countries predictable and based on trust.

CONCLUSION

This work began with an analysis of the writings of Cicero, Plato, and Aristotle—thinkers who lived two millennia ago—and concluded with a look into the future, where artificial intelligence steps onto the main stage. Paradoxically, the postulates of ancient rhetoric and philosophy have become more relevant than ever. In an era of rapid change, when social and technological "imperatives" threaten to outpace the human ability to comprehend their consequences, it is precisely the appeal to eternal principles of logic, justice, and virtue that can guide progress along the right path.

Ancient rhetoric gave birth to law, transforming disparate customs into a coherent system of norms through the power of persuasion and consensus. Now rhetoric (in the broad sense—the ability to reach agreement, to speak in the language of reason and morality) must become the foundation for programming new "digital legislators" and "digital judges." The symbiosis of lawyer and AI is not a replacement of the human being by the machine, but a raising of the human to a new level of responsibility, where his word acquires the force of an algorithm. Lawyer-rhetors will become the creators of the state of the future if they succeed in overcoming hermeneutic bias (their own hidden distortions) and in mastering the cognitive-linguistic approach in training AI—that is, if they learn to speak to machines in the language of principles and concepts, and not only numbers.

One can imagine the near future: courtrooms in which an invisible electronic advisor works behind the judge, ensuring that a decision does not fall outside the bounds of law and common sense; parliaments where each bill undergoes "test driving" on a digital twin of society, warning of potential collisions and protests; registries of property and tax systems entrusted entirely to blockchain ledgers and smart contracts, eliminating corruption and error; finally, citizens for whom interaction with the state becomes as transparent and fast as a banking operation on a smartphone—because all bureaucratic rituals are automated and freed from the human factor. And underlying all of this is Law—no longer merely a text on paper, but a living operational program that precisely follows the spirit of justice. Such a state would be "antifragile" (in the words of N.N. Taleb)—that is, capable of becoming stronger from any shock because its core—its principles—is unshakable, while its periphery flexibly adapts with the help of AI.

Of course, this ideal is still to be realized. Technical difficulties, political and cultural differences, ethical disputes—these must all be overcome. Yet, as history shows, humanity has a powerful ally in such endeavors: the Word armed with Wisdom. Cicero's rhetoric once saved the foundations of Roman legal consciousness in the storm of constitutional upheaval. Later, the ideas of justice, transmitted through Roman law, formed the foundation of European legal systems (the reception of Roman law). Today our task is to pass this baton further, to "teach to think justly" those invisible interlocutors who will appear increasingly often beside us at the conference table or on the judge's bench. In this sense, innovative technologies and classical philosophy do not contradict each other at all but must necessarily unite. *Logos* embodied in silicon—this is how one might call the coming era of legal development. And if it remains faithful to the best human ideals, then we may expect a state in which power, money, and influence all serve not some private gain, but the common good under the vigilant supervision of Reason.

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